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Antitrust Precedent & Anti-Fraternity 
Sentiment: Revisiting Hamilton College 
JARED S. SUNSHINE* 
ABSTRACT 
Over a decade ago, Prof. Mark Bauer wrote an article exploring the 
antitrust implications of a small college’s decision to forbid fraternities 
from competing in the student housing market and the ensuing litigation.  
Expanding this line of research, several key holdings—despite contrary 
antitrust doctrine elsewhere—have granted universities broad authority to 
control the residential choices of their students qua consumers, bespeaking 
a unique relationship between university and student to which the fraternity 
is an interloper.  These core cases casually allude to the ostensibly defunct 
doctrine of in loco parentis, under which colleges were once seen as proxy 
parents to their pupils, implying that in housing matters the paradigm of 
the custodial university retains the force to overcome competitive concerns.  
Given both costs and benefits to that view, this Article calls for more 
judicial scrutiny of the relations amongst colleges, students, and 
fraternities. 
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[A]t various times for various reasons, fraternities have stood directly in 
the way of college efforts to define and refine residential living.  For that 
reason, small colleges have often taken action to weaken the influence of 
fraternities.  The colleges that have actually eliminated fraternities are 
those that believe that they can fully control their environment. 
In that respect, colleges are no different than any other monopolist; they 
are simply trying to control their environment and anyone or anything that 
gets in their way.1 
INTRODUCTION 
Universities2 and their fraternities3 have always made strange 
bedfellows.4  In their origins, college fraternities were conceived as secret 
societies precisely because faculties saw their institution as direct threats to 
academic prerogatives and generally suppressed them vigorously.5  As time 
passed, however, colleges came to depend heavily upon emerging 
fraternities to house their students and began to consider them as vital 
adjuncts to the collegiate experience.6  But of late,                     
universities—particularly private colleges in New England—have once 
 
 1. Mark D. Bauer, Small Liberal Arts Colleges, Fraternities, and Antitrust: Rethinking 
Hamilton College, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 347, 411 (2004) (footnotes omitted). 
 2. “University” and “college” are used interchangeably to refer to institutes of higher 
education.  E.g., Mark D. Bauer, Freedom of Association for College Fraternities After 
Christian Legal Society and Citizens United, 39 J.C. & U.L. 247, 248 n.1 (2013); Note, 
Mandatory Housing Requirements: The Constitutionality of Parietal Rules, 60 IOWA L. REV. 
992, 992 n.3 (1975) [hereinafter Mandatory Housing Requirements]. 
 3. For the sake of concision, this Article uses “fraternity” and “fraternal” throughout to 
refer to both men’s and women’s fraternal organizations.  E.g., Jared S. Sunshine, The 
Fraternity as Franchise: A Conceptual Framework, 42 J.C. & U.L. 375, 376 n.2 (2016) 
[hereinafter Sunshine, Fraternity as Franchise]; Jared S. Sunshine, A Lazarus Taxon in 
South Carolina: A Natural History of National Fraternities’ Respondeat Superior Liability 
for Hazing, 5 CHARLOTTE L. REV. 79, 79 n.4 (2014) [hereinafter Sunshine, Lazarus Taxon]; 
Bauer, supra note 2, at 248 n.2; Bauer, supra note 1, at 347 n.1; Shane Kimzey, Note, The 
Role of Insurance in Fraternity Litigation, 16 REV. LITIG. 459, 460 n.2 (1997); Eric A. 
Paine, Recent Trends in Fraternity-Related Liability, 23 J.L. & EDUC. 191, 191 n.1 (1994); 
Susan J. Curry, Note, Hazing and the “Rush” Toward Reform: Responses from Universities, 
Fraternities, State Legislatures, and the Courts, 16 J.C. & U.L. 93, 93 n.1 (1989); see C. 
Sidney Neuhoff, Note, The Legal Status of Fraternities, 11 ST. LOUIS L. REV. 30, 30 (1925) 
(“No distinction is made in the cases between fraternities and sororities.  The word 
‘fraternity,’ in its generic sense includes organizations of either or both sexes.”). 
 4. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TEMPEST act 2, sc. 2, 1.39 (The Floating Press 
2008) (1623). 
 5. See infra notes 21–25 and accompanying text. 
 6. See infra notes 27–31 and accompanying text. 
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again asserted their purported supervisory rights more robustly to severely 
curtail or even eradicate Greek7 life from campus.8 
Much scholarly literature has emerged on the often-fraught 
relationships between civic municipalities and the universities that 
dominate their social and economic livelihood: so-called town-gown 
relations,9 named after the academic gown once characteristic of the 
scholarly set.10  On issues from property to violent affrays to civil authority, 
city councilors and university deans have clashed over the priorities and 
prerogatives of students and residents for centuries.11  But what of the even 
more fraught relationship between Greek and gown?12  If relations between 
a city and its local college are complicated by intertwined interests, a 
fraternity captive to, but distinctively differentiated from, university 
overseers presents yet more difficult problems.13 
 
 7. Although some might object to “Greek” as an overly informal reference to 
fraternity issues, scholarship is replete with its use and its monosyllabic brevity has much to 
recommend it.  E.g., Dara Aquila Govan, Note, “Hazing Out” the Membership Intake 
Process in Sororities and Fraternities: Preserving the Integrity of the Pledge Process 
Versus Addressing Hazing Liability, 53 RUTGERS L. REV. 679, 681 (2001); Gregory E. 
Rutledge, Hell Night Hath No Fury Like a Pledge Scorned . . . and Injured: Hazing 
Litigation in U.S. Colleges and Universities, 25 J.C. & U.L. 361, 362–63 (1998). 
 8. See Bauer, supra note 1; Zach Schonfeld, Inside the Colleges That Killed Frats for 
Good, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 10, 2014, 12:24 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/inside-colleges-
killed-frats-good-231346 [https://perma.cc/8GNH-HEMJ] (discussing eradication of Greek 
life at Middlebury College, Colby College, Bowdoin College, and Williams College); 
Michael W. Gosk, Comment, From Animal House to No House: Legal Rights of the Banned 
Fraternity, 28 CONN. L. REV. 167, 168 (1995) (discussing restrictions and bans placed on 
Bowdoin, Dickinson, Middlebury, Trinity, Colby, Amherst, and Franklin & Marshall); infra 
note 255 and accompanying text. 
 9. See, e.g., TOWN AND GOWN RELATIONS: A HANDBOOK OF BEST PRACTICES (Roger L. 
Kemp ed. 2013); Stephen D. Bruning, Shea McGrew & Mark Cooper, Town–Gown 
Relationships: Exploring University-Community Engagement from the Perspective of 
Community Members, 32 PUB. REL. REV. 125 (2006); Loomis Mayfield, Town and Gown in 
America: Some Historical and Institutional Issues of the Engaged University, 14 EDUC. FOR 
HEALTH 231 (2001); Laurence Brockliss, Gown and Town: The University and the City in 
Europe, 1200-2000, 38 MINERVA 147 (2000). 
 10. See Mayfield, supra note 9, at 237. 
 11. See Alexandra Shepard, Contesting Communities? ‘Town’ and ‘Gown’ in 
Cambridge, c.1560-1640, in COMMUNITIES IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND 216 (Alexandra 
Shepard & Phil Withington eds., 2000). 
 12. Lacking the opportunity for rhyming portmanteau, alliteration must needs suffice. 
 13. See, e.g., Curry, supra note 3, at 93 (“The relationship between fraternities and 
institutions of higher education has spawned a series of complex legal issues, ranging from 
zoning disputes to fraternity bannings.” (footnotes omitted)); Sunshine, Fraternity as 
Franchise, supra note 3, at 376–77 & nn.4–6. 
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Well over a decade ago, Professor Mark D. Bauer penned an article 
about a seemingly small case in upstate New York, Hamilton Chapter of 
Alpha Delta Phi, Inc. v. Hamilton College,14 in which a fraternity protested 
its expulsion from campus based on antitrust theory.15  The essay, Small 
Liberal Arts Colleges, Fraternities, and Antitrust: Rethinking Hamilton 
College, traced the history of Greek-gown relations and then turned to the 
perplexingly uniform phenomenon of antagonism towards fraternities in 
small New England liberal arts colleges.16  Using Hamilton College as a 
lens, Bauer was able to pinpoint the sources of conflict and validate the 
persuasive arguments made by plaintiffs that the college’s actions were 
highly suspect at best under antitrust law.17  Although ostensibly rooted in a 
single case and the rather esoteric niche of collegiate residential housing 
markets, Bauer’s discussion raised provocative questions regarding the 
power of universities qua competitors in a commercial market.18 
This Article seeks to draw on legal precedent to situate and analyze 
the frequent antagonism that colleges have displayed toward their captive 
fraternities.19  Part I offers the briefest of summaries of the synergetic 
evolution of early universities and fraternities and traces the structural 
changes over time that have led to today’s collegiate market for services 
and sometimes virulently anti-Greek sentiment.  In light of this evolution, 
Part II revisits some of the questions raised in Bauer’s Rethinking Hamilton 
College: to what extent are universities and their fraternities in competition, 
and what does antitrust precedent have to contribute?  Given more recent 
developments on campus, in legal scholarship, and in judicial opinion, 
Bauer’s prescriptions regarding antitrust analysis seem all the more 
prescient.  Part III focuses on a differentiating factor mentioned in the 
Greek-gown antitrust cases: the sui generis role of the university in 
overseeing its students, variously referred to as parietal rights or in loco 
parentis, casting the college as a proxy parent to its students.  In 
conclusion, Part IV asks whether the frequent rivalry between fraternities 
 
 14. Hamilton Chapter of Alpha Delta Phi, Inc. v. Hamilton Coll., 128 F.3d 59 (2d Cir. 
1997). 
 15. Bauer, supra note 1; see Robert E. Manley, Antitrust Implications of Fraternity 
Mistreatment by Colleges, FRATERNAL L., Nov. 2004, at 1, 1–2 (discussing Bauer’s article). 
 16. Bauer, supra note 1, at 351–58; see also Schonfeld, supra note 8 (discussing several 
other liberal arts colleges’ antagonism). 
 17. Bauer, supra note 1, at 368–410. 
 18. Bauer, supra note 1, at 410–12; see also Jeffrey C. Sun & Philip T.K. Daniel, The 
Sherman Act Antitrust Provisions and Collegiate Action: Should There Be a Continued 
Exception for the Business of the University?, 25 J.C. & U.L. 451, 493–95 (1999). 
 19. Besides the considerable debt owed to Professor Bauer, this Article also serves to 
follow up on some of the questions about colleges and competition law raised previously by 
this author elsewhere.  See Sunshine, Fraternity as Franchise, supra note 3, at 405–06. 
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and their host institutions is as inevitable as it sometimes seems, given the 
long-standing and unique relationships amongst them and the student body. 
This last issue is the animating force of this Article.  Bauer’s canny 
identification of the antitrust regime as an analytical framework provides 
legal grounding, but the underlying challenge is explaining the persistent 
animus between many colleges and chapters.  Commercial competition 
between the two provides one explanation, but the unique relationship of 
the university and its students must also be a factor: a relationship to which 
the fraternity is an interloper.  Although courts have ostensibly rejected 
colleges’ onetime dictatorial power over their students, appearances 
suggest such tendencies are philosophically alive and well at some small 
liberal arts colleges, if not also at larger institutions.  As with many 
multigenerational feuds, resolving age-old differences between hoary 
institutions like universities and fraternities will not be easy.  Antitrust 
precedent, perhaps, provides a distinctive and unexpected perspective in 
considering whether a lasting détente will ever prove possible. 
I. THE EVOLUTION OF GREEK-GOWN RELATIONS 
Fraternalism has been a uniquely North American institution, at least 
for most of its history; many authors have catalogued it well.20  From the 
start, however, fraternities and the universities at which they arose found 
themselves fiercely at odds.21  Faculties demanded the eradication of any 
secret society, the taking of oaths abjuring membership, and the expulsion 
of any student persisting in association.22  The reasoning was generally that 
such societies split the atom of student loyalty, preventing the faculty from 
exercising proper discipline over their charges, particularly in the 
regimented era of academia preceding the Civil War.23  Those early 
 
 20. The doyen of fraternal historians will always remain the author of the eponymous 
manual, see WM. RAIMOND BAIRD, BAIRD’S MANUAL OF AMERICAN COLLEGE FRATERNITIES 
(6th ed. 1905), but many others have followed in his footsteps, not the least of which is 
Bauer himself.  See Bauer, supra note 1, at 351–58; see also NICHOLAS L. SYRETT, THE 
COMPANY HE KEEPS: A HISTORY OF WHITE COLLEGE FRATERNITIES (2009). 
 21. See SYRETT, supra note 20, at 35–37; JOHN S. BRUBACHER & WILLIS RUDY, HIGHER 
EDUCATION IN TRANSITION 127 (Transaction Publishers 4th ed. 1997) (1958) (“The rise of 
fraternities did not come without strife.  On many campuses, both faculty and students were 
bitterly opposed to them . . . .”). 
 22. E.g., People ex rel. Pratt v. Wheaton Coll., 40 Ill. 186, 186 (1866); see SYRETT, 
supra note 20, at 35–37; BRUBACHER & RUDY, supra note 21, at 127. 
 23. See Wheaton Coll., 40 Ill. at 187 (explaining faculty rationale for challenging 
societies); SYRETT, supra note 20, at 15–16 (discussing the regimented schedule of pre-Civil 
War college students); Bauer, supra note 1, at 351 (discussing the regimented nature of 
universities). 
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colleges typically regulated their charges minutely, including the 
employment of corporal punishment.24  Such scrutiny and hostility made it 
expedient, indeed vital, for early fraternities to function under the strictest 
secrecy, as any breach thereof risked annihilation.25 
Antagonism began to ebb in part because of the necessities of housing.  
The earliest colleges had provided housing for their small student 
populations, but burgeoning universities now found it increasingly difficult 
to accommodate students economically, leading them to relax residency 
rules.26  Fraternities, once largely social groups, were able to come out of 
the shadows to provide room and board.27  Indeed, rivalries quickly sprang 
up between societies vying for what amounted to lucrative business 
opportunities to secure a lessee for a long-term contract.28  Such 
competition gave rise to a residential arms race: ever more ornate and 
commodious chapterhouses, the better to lure students qua consumers to 
their doors.29  Universities acquiesced in or even encouraged this 
development, as the magnificence of such residences reflected admirably 
on colleges as well as fraternities and attracted better applicants without 
 
 24. Brian Jackson, Note, The Lingering Legacy of In Loco Parentis: An Historical 
Survey and Proposal for Reform, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1135, 1140 & n.30 (1991).  See also 
SYRETT, supra note 20, at 15–17. 
 25. See Bauer, supra note 1, at 352; SYRETT, supra note 20, at 36–37; BRUBACHER & 
RUDY, supra note 21, at 127 (“In many places, the fraternity movement was driven 
underground, but it was by no means extirpated completely.  The attempts by college 
faculties to wipe out fraternities ultimately failed because it was impossible to achieve a 
common front on this matter.”). 
 26. See BRUBACHER & RUDY, supra note 21, at 121–22 (“[Colleges] found themselves 
without the funds to provide dormitory facilities for their constantly enlarging enrollment.  It 
was all they could do to find enough money for instruction, salaries, and classroom 
buildings.  Thus the dormitory system fell into disuse for financial as well as ideological 
reasons.”). 
 27. BRUBACHER & RUDY, supra note 21, at 122, 128; Bauer, supra note 1, at 355; see 
also 3 THOMAS D. CLARK, INDIANA UNIVERSITY: MIDWESTERN PIONEER 239–40 (1977) 
(“Historically, Greek letter fraternities had been a part of Indiana University since 1845.  In 
earlier years the organizations had made material contributions in solving a part of the 
student housing problems.”); Anne Willson Bartels, Anti Fraternity Agitation, 51 ANCHORA 
DELTA GAMMA, 1934, at 22, 25; H.I. Brock, Reappraising the College Fraternity, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 19, 1933, at 9 (“[I]t was noted that the fraternities had served a useful purpose 
for many years by taking over the job of housing and feeding undergraduates which the 
university had neglected to assume.”), reprinted in 21 RATTLE THETA CHI, Feb. 1933, at 7; 
BAIRD, supra note 20, at 32–33. 
 28. See, e.g., BAIRD, supra note 20, at 32–33 (describing the trend towards “senseless 
rivalry” amongst fraternities in the construction of ever more expensive housing); SYRETT, 
supra note 20, at 163–64. 
 29. BAIRD, supra note 20, at 32–33. 
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costing the college a dime.30  Fraternal assets accordingly grew rapidly: in 
1905, the value of fraternities’ residential property was estimated within $3 
million;31 by 1920, it had risen to over $17 million, and by 1927, $64 
million.32 
Yet doubts about the salutary influence of fraternities persisted, 
particularly among faculties.  Following World War II, colleges began to 
focus more firmly on programs constructing dormitories under their own 
control, which naturally brought them into competition with the very 
institutions they had once fostered to address their deficiencies.33  
Mandatory residency requirements were often reasserted to finance this 
construction.34  Moreover, perceptions of student-body moral dissolution in 
the post-war era often settled on the more tangible targets fraternities 
provided, leading universities and society at large to view Greek life as a 
threat to student scruples.35  And, of course, housing was increasingly a big 
business, and colleges no less than any other enterprise are always seeking 
new revenue streams to fund their operations.36  As the twentieth century 
progressed towards its end, a notable minority of colleges began to 
promulgate policies that severely restricted or banned fraternities.37  Often, 
these interdictions were pronounced for the express purpose of 
monopolizing student housing under the college’s control.38 
 
 30. See Bauer, supra note 1, at 355–56; BAIRD, supra note 20, at 32–33 (“All of this has 
resulted in direct benefit to the colleges, and the wiser among college officials are 
encouraging the development of this feature of fraternity life in every way possible.  The 
advantages of the chapter-house system are not altogether on the side of the student.  They 
relieve the colleges from the necessity of increasing the dormitory accommodations . . . .”); 
BRUBACHER & RUDY, supra note 21, at 129. 
 31. BAIRD, supra note 20, at 33. 
 32. BRUBACHER & RUDY, supra note 21, at 129; see also infra note 460 and 
accompanying text (estimating modern value of fraternal property at $3 billion). 
 33. Bauer, supra note 1, at 356; Mandatory Housing Requirements, supra note 2, at 
994–95. 
 34. See Mandatory Housing Requirements, supra note 2, at 995–96; Paul Jerald Ward, 
Parietal Regulations and the University: Required Residence in Campus Dormitories, 5 
HUM. RTS. 215, 231–34 (1976). 
 35. See LAURIE A. WILKIE, THE LOST BOYS OF ZETA PSI: A HISTORICAL ARCHAEOLOGY 
OF MASCULINITY AT A UNIVERSITY FRATERNITY 231–34 (2010); Gosk, supra note 8, at 168–
69. 
 36. See Ward, supra note 34, at 231–34; Mandatory Housing Requirements, supra note 
2, at 995–96; infra notes 460–64 and accompanying text. 
 37. See Mandatory Housing Requirements, supra note 2, at 997–99; Schonfeld, supra 
note 8. 
 38. See Bauer, supra note 1, at 349–50; see also Mandatory Housing Requirements, 
supra note 2, at 998–1000. 
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Throughout the evolution of fraternities and universities, the lodestar 
of Greek-gown relations has remained remarkably fixed: colleges have 
been viewed as entitled by right to enforce absolute control over their 
students and to allow external influences only at their sufferance.39  Thus, 
while universities might have permitted fraternity operations in eras of 
housing shortages,40 they remained putatively free to withdraw that consent 
should their interests in student discipline so demand.41  It is revealing to 
peruse the opinions of three different courts separated by half-century 
intervals, each reviewing college interdictions of fraternities.  First, from 
the Illinois Supreme Court in 1866: 
  We perceive nothing unreasonable in the rule itself, since all persons 
familiar with college life know that the tendency of secret societies is to 
withdraw students from the control of the faculty, and impair to some 
extent the discipline of the institution.  Such may not always be their effect, 
but such is their general tendency.  But whether the rule be judicious or not, 
it violates neither good morals nor the law of the land, and is therefore 
clearly within the power of the college authorities to make and enforce.42 
Next, from the United States Supreme Court in 1915: 
  It is said that the fraternity to which complainant belongs is a moral and 
of itself a disciplinary force.  This need not be denied. But whether such 
membership makes against discipline was for the State of Mississippi to 
determine.  It is to be remembered that the University was established by 
the State and is under the control of the State, and the enactment of the 
statute may have been induced by the opinion that membership in the 
prohibited societies divided the attention of the students and distracted from 
that singleness of purpose which the State desired to exist in its public 
educational institutions.  It is not for us to entertain conjectures in 
opposition to the views of the State and annul its regulations upon 
disputable considerations of their wisdom or necessity.43 
And finally, from a New York trial court in 1965: 
  The university must always be in a position to exercise sufficient 
supervision over students and their social organizations to assure 
compliance with university policies.  So long as such organizations are 
local in nature, the situation is manageable.  But when they involve ties 
outside the university over which the university can exercise no control, 
serious conflicts may arise.  This is something a university cannot tolerate.  
 
 39. See, e.g., infra notes 42–44 and accompanying text. 
 40. See, e.g., Brock, supra note 27. 
 41. See, e.g., infra notes 42–44 and accompanying text; see also infra Sections II.B.1, 
II.B.2, II.B.5, II.C.2. 
 42. People ex rel. Pratt v. Wheaton Coll., 40 Ill. 186, 187 (1866). 
 43. Waugh v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Miss., 237 U.S. 589, 596–97 (1915). 
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It cannot allow itself to be placed in the position of sanctioning student 
social organizations which are governed by, and responsible to, 
non-university authority. 
  The existence of national fraternities and sororities at a university 
presents just such an anomaly.44 
Is it not striking how similar these sentiments have remained over time?  
The judiciary seems quite willing to accept that the very existence of 
fraternities somehow detracts from the proper discipline and order that a 
college and its faculty have the right to enforce at any cost.  Another half 
century after the last of these rulings, it is far from clear that a court today 
would rule any differently.45  Whether modern antitrust law suggests 
otherwise is the subject of the next Part. 
II. ANTITRUST PRECEDENT AND THE COLLEGIATE RESIDENTIAL MARKET 
At common law, anticompetitive action was generally limited to 
practices that could be classified as such per se, such as overt 
monopolization, price fixing, or agreements not to compete.46  This 
sufficed well enough for the more provincial markets of the Victorian Era, 
but the tremendous expansion of commercial scope during the Second 
Industrial Revolution gave rise to new problems.47  In particular, groups of 
American industrialists began to combine their interests into cooperative 
trusts whose purpose was to corner an entire sector of the market, thus 
allowing the trust to effectively set prices.48  Such compacts overwhelmed 
the limited scope of the common law and were ultimately met with 
 
 44. Beta Sigma Rho, Inc. v. Moore, 261 N.Y.S.2d 658, 662 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965) 
(quoting report entitled “The University and its Student Social Organizations,” prepared by 
the President of the State University of New York in 1953, pursuant to an order from the 
University’s Board of Trustees). 
 45. See, e.g., infra Section II.B.5 (discussing a 2007 case). 
 46. Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 497 (1940) (“The common law 
doctrines relating to contracts and combinations in restraint of trade were well understood 
long before the enactment of the Sherman law. They were contracts for the restriction or 
suppression of competition in the market, agreements to fix prices, divide marketing 
territories, apportion customers, restrict production and the like practices, which tend to 
raise prices or otherwise take from buyers or consumers the advantages which accrue to 
them from free competition in the market.” (footnote omitted)); see KEITH N. HYLTON, 
ANTITRUST LAW: ECONOMIC THEORY AND COMMON LAW EVOLUTION 35–37 (2003); Sun & 
Daniel, supra note 18, at 453–54. 
 47. See 1 EARL W. KINTNER, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST 
LAWS AND RELATED STATUTES, 8–15 (1978); HYLTON, supra note 46, at 38. 
 48. See HYLTON, supra note 46, at 37–40; KINTNER, supra note 47; Sun & Daniel, 
supra note 18, at 453–54. 
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legislation in the late 1800s49: the Sherman Antitrust Act, which contained 
two provisions protecting vigorous competition that remain in force to this 
day.50 
The first prescribes that “[e]very contract, combination in the form of 
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among 
the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal;”51 the 
second that “[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt to 
monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to 
monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or 
with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony . . . .”52  Despite the 
sweeping language, the courts quickly concluded that only unreasonable 
restraints on trade were illegal, lest the most picayune (or procompetitive) 
agreement give rise to liability.53  The provision against monopolization, 
however, needed no such limiting gloss and has been rightly read broadly 
to prevent oligopolies as well as strict monopolies—the concentration of 
power in any market in too few hands.54 
For alleged restraints of trade that resembled the early common law 
infractions and were nigh invariably harmful—bid rigging, tying, price 
fixing, and the like—the courts continued to follow what is aptly known as 
the per se rule.55  This doctrine conserves judicial resources by declaring 
that certain practices are automatically unreasonable and therefore illegal 
under the Sherman Act, and can have no saving justification or 
countervailing benefit.56  Given that companies are wary of such 
transparent illegality, however, many antitrust cases involve more nuanced 
theories of how the defendants’ conduct frustrates free competition.57  
 
 49. See KINTNER, supra note 47; HYLTON, supra note 46, at 37–40; William L. Letwin, 
Congress and the Sherman Antitrust Law: 1887-1890, 23 U. CHI. L. REV. 221, 235 (1956); 
Sun & Daniel, supra note 18, at 453–55. 
 50. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (2012). 
 51. Id. § 1. 
 52. Id. § 2. 
 53. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1911); Bd. of 
Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). 
 54. See, e.g., Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 797 (1946). 
 55. See, e.g., N. Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1958) (citing United States 
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 210 (1940); United States v. Addyston Pipe & 
Steel Co., 85 F. 271, aff’d, 175 U.S. 211 (1899); Fashion Originators’ Guild v. Federal 
Trade Comm’n, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947)) 
(tying); Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. at 283–84 (bid rigging), aff’d, 175 U.S. 211 
(1899). 
 56. E.g., N. Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. at 5; United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 
282–83 (1942). 
 57. E.g., Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 332–34 (1990). 
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These more difficult cases are analyzed under the “rule of reason,” which 
asks whether the demonstrated anticompetitive aspects of the conduct at 
issue are outweighed by procompetitive aspects, considering all the 
circumstances.58  As the name suggests, the answer reflects whether the 
conduct is reasonable or not.59 
Similarly, to intelligibly accuse someone of monopolizing “any part of 
the trade or commerce among the several States,” a discernible part—a 
relevant product and geographic market—must be pled.60  The courts have 
settled on the criterion of substitutability to define this relevant market,61 
generally setting its boundaries to include those products that a consumer 
would view as reasonably interchangeable given a small but significant 
non-transitory increase in price in one, because only such products are truly 
in competition with one another.62  For example, the Supreme Court found 
that many flexible wrapping materials were interchangeable, and thus one 
company’s supremacy in cellophane manufacture could not give rise to 
liability, as it had only a small share of the properly defined market for all 
wrapping materials.63  By contrast, a district court enjoined a merger 
between sellers of loose leaf tobacco after finding that other tobacco 
products would not be viewed by consumers as substitutable in the event of 
monopolistic price increases in loose leaf.64  This emphasizes the point that 
to improperly dominate the relevant market, the alleged monopolist must 
be able to exert market power, viz., to profitably set prices above those 
which would be imposed by healthy competition.65 
 
 58. See, e.g., Bd. of Trade of Chi., 246 U.S. at 238.  There is arguably a third standard, 
known as “quick look” review under the rule of reason, which seeks to gain the efficiencies 
of expeditious review without imposing the onerous automatic liability of the per se rule.  
See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 100–04 (1984). 
 59. See Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1911); Bd. of Trade of 
Chi., 246 U.S. at 238–39. 
 60. See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 173 
n.1 (1965) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970) (amended 1974)); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman 
Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 268–69 (2d Cir. 1979). 
 61. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962). 
 62. See id.; United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 396–404 
(1956); Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino’s Pizza, Inc., 124 F.3d 430, 438 (3d Cir. 1997); 
see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 
4.1 (2010). 
 63. E.I. du Pont, 351 U.S. at 403–04.  This classic antitrust holding, widely known as 
the “Cellophane Case,” has garnered much criticism, beginning nearly immediately after its 
announcement.  E.g., Donald F. Turner, Antitrust Policy and the Cellophane Case, 70 
HARV. L. REV. 281 (1956). 
 64. FTC v. Swedish Match, 131 F. Supp. 2d 151, 173 (D.D.C. 2000). 
 65. Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 27 n.46 (1984); George A. 
Hay, Market Power in Antitrust, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 807, 812–13 (1992). 
12
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 2
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol39/iss1/2
2017] REVISITING HAMILTON COLLEGE 71 
A. The College in Commerce: Competition Law on Campus 
Foundationally, the Sherman Act addresses only commercial 
conduct.66  This seemingly tautological requirement is relevant to 
universities because, for much of their existence, their role was viewed as 
scholastic and insusceptible to economic concerns such as restraint of 
trade.67  Ironically, despite enormous trusts inuring to their benefit,68 
colleges went effectively untouched by antitrust law.69  This began to 
change with the Supreme Court’s 1975 recognition in Goldfarb v. Virginia 
State Bar70 that when they engaged in commercial behavior, non-profit 
organizations were just as susceptible to antitrust law as their for-profit 
counterparts.71  Concurrently, courts were increasingly concluding that the 
modern university often acts as a business rather than a cloistered ivory 
tower.72  Nowadays, only when the university is acting as non-profit 
educator rather than commercial competitor might anticompetitive 
activities be exempted from scrutiny.73 
Most obviously, colleges compete strenuously with one another to 
attract and enroll students because those students are their core 
consumers.74  Thus when a council of colleges agreed to regulate financial 
aid grants and concomitant tuitions that colleges would offer to their 
applicants, a district court concluded their actions amounted to nothing 
 
 66. E.g., Missouri v. Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc., 620 F.2d 1301, 1319 (8th Cir. 1980) 
(holding economic boycott undertaken as an act of political expression was non-commercial 
in nature and thus not subject to the Sherman Act); see Sun & Daniel, supra note 18, at 451. 
 67. See Sun & Daniel, supra note 18, at 452; DEREK BOK, BEYOND THE IVORY TOWER: 
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE MODERN UNIVERSITY 2–5 (1982). 
 68. See, e.g., James B. Stewart, In College Endowment Returns, Davids Beat the 
Goliaths, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/26/business/in-
college-endowment-returns-davids-beat-the-goliaths.html [https://perma.cc/RBH6-CWPU]. 
 69. See Sun & Daniel, supra note 18, at 451. 
 70. Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975). 
 71. Id. at 787 (citing United States v. Nat’l Ass’n of Real Estate Boards, 339 U.S. 485, 
489 (1950)); see Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 694–96 (1978); 
FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 463 (1986). 
 72. See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 111 (1984); 
Hamilton Chapter of Alpha Delta Phi, Inc. v. Hamilton Coll., 128 F.3d 59, 65 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(“The case law thus recognizes that institutions of higher learning engage in a wide 
spectrum of conduct, ranging from the distinctly noncommercial to the purely 
proprietary.”); infra notes 74, 79 and accompanying text. 
 73. See Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 787; Selman v. Harvard Med. Sch., 494 F. Supp. 603, 
620–21 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); compare NCAA, 468 U.S. at 100 n.22 (discussing the licensing of 
college sports on television within scope of the Sherman Act), with Marjorie Webster Junior 
Coll., Inc. v. Middle States Ass’n of Colls. and Secondary Schs., Inc., 432 F.2d 650, 654 
(D.C. Cir. 1970) (discussing the accreditation of schools not commercial in nature). 
 74. See, e.g., infra Sections II.B.2, II.B.4, II.B.5. 
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more than a conspiracy to fix prices in violation of the Sherman Act, in 
United States v. Brown University.75  On appeal, the Third Circuit was 
persuaded that the situation of colleges was sufficiently complex to demand 
a full rule of reason analysis and remanded the case for that review in the 
first instance.76  But the appellate court left scant doubt of its leanings: 
financial aid was not charity but rather “part and parcel of the process of 
setting tuition and thus a commercial transaction.”77  The court made short 
work of the colleges’ arguments to the contrary, finding that the avowed 
purpose of the council was “to eliminate price competition for talented 
students among member institutions,” whilst expressing some skepticism as 
to MIT’s arguments about the countervailing social goods occasioned by 
such “a price fixing mechanism.”78  Ultimately, Congress was obliged to 
pass a temporary amendment to the Sherman Act to allow universities to 
collaborate in issuing need-blind financial aid.79 
Similarly, when educational institutions operate stores selling goods 
such as books to its students, they are engaging in commercial behavior and 
cannot escape scrutiny.  In Sunshine Books, Ltd. v. Temple University,80 the 
Third Circuit found that a college bookstore was capable of engaging in 
predatory pricing: that is, temporarily setting prices below costs to drive 
rivals out of business and thus monopolize the market.81  The fact that book 
sales may be tangentially related to an educational mission was not an 
issue, given that the sale of “textbook titles used each semester in Temple’s 
undergraduate and graduate courses . . . [along with] clothing, gifts, 
greeting cards, newspapers, magazines, and other publications of general 
interest” placed the university in direct competition with generic 
booksellers.82  Rather, the court’s analysis focused on the microeconomics 
of whether the university’s pricing was merely discounted or actually 
predatory, ultimately remanding to the trial court for that determination.83 
Finally, state schools are generally exempt from antitrust scrutiny 
under what has come to be called Parker immunity, after the leading case, 
 
 75. United States v. Brown Univ., 805 F. Supp. 288, 302 (E.D. Pa. 1992), rev’d, 5 F.3d 
658 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 76. Id. at 670–72, 678. 
 77. Id. at 668. 
 78. Id. at 673–75. 
 79. Application of Antitrust Laws to Award of Need-Based Educational Aid, Pub. L. 
No. 103-382, § 568(a)-(d), 108 Stat. 4060 (1994); see Sun & Daniel, supra note 18, at   
491–92. 
 80. Sunshine Books, Ltd. v. Temple Univ., 697 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1982). 
 81. Id. at 91. 
 82. See id. at 91–92. 
 83. Id. at 92–93. 
14
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 2
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol39/iss1/2
2017] REVISITING HAMILTON COLLEGE 73 
Parker v. Brown.84  There, the Court held that when a state enacts a clear 
policy of anticompetitive restraint, the Sherman Act will not curtail its 
enactment.85  As discussed already, a private college might be held liable 
for engaging in pricing conduct that steers students to its own bookstore 
instead of a competitor.86  A public institution, however, cannot: in Cowboy 
Book v. Board of Regents for Agricultural & Mechanical Colleges ex rel. 
Oklahoma State University of Agriculture & Applied Science,87 a federal 
court allowed Oklahoma State University to subsidize purchases at its own 
proprietary bookstore, viewing the measures as financial aid to students 
within the ambit of protected state action.88  No less than any other arm of 
state government, public schools enjoy antitrust immunity. 
B. Rivals for Residential Students: Revisiting Hamilton College 
In so holding, the Cowboy Book court offered an observation that 
leads naturally to Hamilton College and its siblings, concerning the 
residential life of the student population: 
Extension of credit to students for rental of dormitory rooms could well be 
attacked by rental businesses in the university town.  Along the same lines, 
extensions of credit for room and board costs may include payments for 
food prepared in the school cafeteria.  These extensions of credit could be 
subject to attack by local restaurants and fast food businesses.89 
Such concerns had been touched on four years earlier in American 
National Bank & Trust Company of Chicago v. Board of Regents for 
Regency Universities.90  A state school, Northern Illinois University, 
required that freshmen under the age of twenty-one reside in university 
residence halls so long as space was available.91  The owner of a private 
rental dormitory sued under the antitrust laws, claiming that even when 
space was unavailable, the university assigned freshmen to temporary 
housing and kept them there “until so shortly before the commencement of 
the school year as to preclude plaintiffs from a realistic entry into the 
market,” thus monopolizing the collegiate housing market.92  The court, 
 
 84. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). 
 85. Id. at 350–52. 
 86. See supra notes 80–83 and accompanying text. 
 87. Cowboy Book, Ltd. v. Bd. of Regents for Agric. & Mech. Colls. ex rel. Okla. State 
Univ. of Agric. & Applied Sci., 728 F. Supp. 1518 (W.D. Okla. 1989). 
 88. Id. at 1523. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Am. Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co. of Chi. v. Bd. of Regents for Regency Univs., 607 F. 
Supp. 845 (N.D. Ill. 1984). 
 91. Id. at 846. 
 92. Id. at 846–47 (quoting the plaintiff’s memorandum). 
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however, easily found that the university’s rule on freshman residency was 
state policy and would be immune under Parker.93 
The plaintiff, however, had cleverly argued that the university was 
violating its own policy for the purpose of shutting out competitors and 
cornering student fees, even when it had no dormitory space left to offer 
students.94  As the court had emphasized in Brown, the intent of the college 
is germane to evaluating the competitive character of its conduct: a school 
acting for pecuniary motivations may be liable whilst one following a 
genuine academic policy is exempted.95  The court in American National 
Bank could not assess on the record presented whether the college’s goal 
was to reinforce its residential program or to eke out fees for non-existent 
rooms, and thus the court declined to dismiss and allowed for further 
discovery.96  Shortly thereafter, the parties settled.97 
The residential requirement promulgated by Northern Illinois was a 
species of what are called parietal rules.  Such rules typically oblige some 
subset (or indeed, the entirety) of a collegiate population to reside under 
certain conditions and follow certain policies; typically the conditions 
involve on-campus dormitory housing, and the policies, at least 
traditionally, concern visitation hours and fraternization between male and 
female students.98  These rules cannot be readily challenged as 
anticompetitive when they form the pedagogical program of a state school 
under Parker antitrust immunity.99  The central question raised by Bauer is 
whether a private university can promulgate rules regarding residency that 
have the intended consequence of ousting competing residential services, 
such as those offered by fraternities, from the market.100  As Bauer 
concluded, the answer would seem to be in the negative based on antitrust 
principles,101 but the actual cases—both in Hamilton College and 
subsequently—contort themselves ingeniously to avoid reaching that 
result.102 
 
 93. Id. at 850. 
 94. Id. at 850–51. 
 95. See United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 667, 672–73 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 96. Am. Nat’l Bank, 607 F. Supp. at 851. 
 97. See Sun & Daniel, supra note 18, at 494 n.366. 
 98. See, e.g., Ward, supra note 34; Mandatory Housing Requirements, supra note 2; 
infra Part III. 
 99. See Am. Nat’l Bank, 607 F. Supp. at 850. 
 100. See, e.g., Bauer, supra note 1; Manley, supra note 15, at 2. 
 101. See Bauer, supra note 1, at 410–12. 
 102. See infra Sections II.B.2, II.B.4, II.B.5. 
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1. Mu Theta of Tau Kappa Epsilon v. Lycoming College 
If Hamilton College is a relatively small case,103 then Mu Theta of Tau 
Kappa Epsilon v. Lycoming College104 must be called a minuscule one, 
occupying only three pages of the Pennsylvania reporter.   Lycoming 
College is a small liberal arts institution in rural Williamsport, 
Pennsylvania, and has been home to fraternities since the turn of the 
twentieth century,105 including the Mu Theta chapter of Tau Kappa Epsilon 
established in the 1968–69 term.106  Given the nature of small town life, 
Greek-gown relations had historically been rather cooperative, with 
fraternities working with the university to manage residential and 
communal offerings.107  Indeed, in 2001 the school’s official magazine put 
forth a retrospective on fifty years of Greek life that painted fraternities as 
an essential social outlet for the university throughout their existence.108 
The reality was not quite so harmonious, however: change had come 
in 1975 when the college notified fraternities that “effective with the  
1976–1977 academic year, the College’s residents’ policy will permit 
students to live off campus in private housing or in fraternity houses only to 
the extent that the number of resident students exceeds the capacity of the 
residence halls.”109  In short, Lycoming instituted the same policy as had 
Northern Illinois: students would only be permitted to patronize competing 
residential providers if Lycoming ran short of space.110  The difference, of 
course, was that Northern Illinois was a state school, immune from antitrust 
scrutiny, whilst Lycoming was a private concern. 
 
 103. See supra text accompanying note 15. 
 104. Mu Theta of Tau Kappa Epsilon v. Lycoming Coll., 75 Pa. D. & C. 2d 420 (Pa. Ct. 
C.P. 1976). 
 105. 50 Years of Fraternity Life at Lycoming College, LYCOMING C. MAG., Spring 2001, 
at 1, 1–7.  In explaining the genesis of Greek life at Lycoming College, the author of the 
article wrote: 
 Fraternities arrived at Lycoming College at about the same time as the 
institution became a four-year college.  Theta Pi Pi was already there.  Originally 
a literary society, it was a local social organization dating back to 1905.  But it 
wasn’t the kind of national fraternity other colleges had. 
 Lambda Phi, organized itself in 1949 as a local fraternity, then petitioned to 
become affiliated with Lambda Chi Alpha. 
Id. at 1. 
 106. Compare 50 Years, supra note 105, at 2 (giving foundation as 1968), with 
Lycoming Coll., 75 Pa. D. & C. 2d at 421 (giving foundation as 1969). 
 107. 50 Years, supra note 105, at 1–3; see Lycoming Coll., 75 Pa. D. & C. 2d at 421. 
 108. 50 Years, supra note 105, at 1–7. 
 109. Lycoming Coll., 75 Pa. D. & C. 2d at 422. 
 110. See Am. Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co. of Chi. v. Bd. of Regents for Regency Univs., 607 F. 
Supp. 845, 846 (N.D. Ill. 1984). 
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Lycoming provided “several reasons in justification of this decision: a 
reduction in enrollment precluding the possibility of keeping the college’s 
residence halls filled; an alleged illegality under Federal law in permitting 
members of the fraternity to reside off campus; and general philosophic 
considerations and attitudes of various members of the administration.”111  
Setting aside the dubious reference to illegality112 and to individual 
sentiments, the college thus advanced one overriding reason for its action: 
it had costly residence halls going unused as matriculations fell and 
students opted for other options, and sought to regain the revenues from the 
space it had.113  The court suggested in American National Bank that such a 
commercial motive might expose even a public school to antitrust liability 
for lack of a basis in public policy.114  Other authorities have echoed that 
parietal regulations will be struck down on other grounds if their sole 
rationale is financial, as opposed to a legitimate educational aim.115 
The difficulty for Lycoming was that the college’s own handbook 
stated in no uncertain terms that providing students the option of living in 
independently owned fraternity housing was an integral part of its 
educational aims: 
It is the purpose of Lycoming College to provide varied opportunities for 
differing kinds of living experiences for its students, to the extent possible.  
(a) The principal means by which Lycoming College attempts to meet this 
obligation is by providing residence halls on its campus that are owned, 
governed and supervised by the College . . . (b) The second means by 
which Lycoming College provides varied living experiences is through the 
opportunity for organized fraternal groups to purchase and operate their 
own independent house off campus . . .116 
 
 111. Lycoming Coll., 75 Pa. D. & C. 2d at 422. 
 112. If allowing fraternity members to reside off-campus were actually illegal under 
federal law, that illegality has apparently escaped the notice of the thousands of colleges and 
millions of college students who have engaged in just such practices around the nation.  But 
cf. text quoted infra note 439 (making the same sort of argument). 
 113. See also Ward, supra note 34, at 231–34 (evaluating commercial motivations 
generally for requiring residency given falling occupancy in residence halls); Mandatory 
Housing Requirements, supra note 2, at 955. 
 114. Am. Nat’l Bank, 607 F. Supp. at 851. 
 115. See Prostrollo v. Univ. of S.D., 369 F. Supp. 778 (D.S.D.), rev’d, 507 F.2d 775 (8th 
Cir. 1974); Pratz v. La. Polytechnic Inst., 316 F. Supp. 872 (W.D. La. 1970), appeal 
dismissed, 401 U.S. 951, aff’d per curiam, 401 U.S. 1004 (1971); Ward, supra note 34, at 
232–34 (discussing Mollere v. S.E. La. Coll., 304 F. Supp. 826 (E.D. La. 1969)); Schick v. 
Kent State Univ., Civil No. 74-646 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 19, 1975); see also Mandatory Housing 
Requirements, supra note 2. 
 116. Lycoming Coll., 75 Pa. D. & C. 2d at 422 (quoting Lycoming College’s student 
handbook, The Guidepost). 
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By its own account, not only was Lycoming failing to advance a 
legitimate aim, it was actively thwarting one.  When the Tau Kappa 
Epsilon chapter sued over the college’s change in policy, it made much of 
the college’s own emphasis on fraternities as an adjunct to its mission.117  
Such a sacrifice of purported pedagogical benefit on the altar of pecuniary 
gain should have at least piqued the court’s skepticism—had only the 
plaintiff thought to plead violations of antitrust law.118  As the chapter did 
not, however, the court made short work of dismissing its claims of 
constitutional violations and equitable estoppel.119  The question of the 
antitrust implications of plans like Lycoming’s would have to wait another 
quarter century.120 
2. Hamilton Chapter of Alpha Delta Phi v. Hamilton College 
It would be redundant (and impossible) to duplicate the lavish detail 
that Bauer brought to the practical and legal disputes between Hamilton 
College and its fraternities; a summary treatment will suffice.121  Hamilton 
has occupied a small rural town in upstate New York since its foundation in 
1812, making it one of the oldest colleges in the United States.122  For most 
of its existence, Hamilton had not prescribed any particular room and board 
arrangements for its students other than freshmen, who were required to 
live on campus.123  Upperclassmen had thus been free to patronize 
fraternities for 150 years,124 and as of 1993 the university and fraternities 
were splitting the housing market for students, albeit rather asymmetrically: 
the university was grossing roughly $7 million per year for housing, while 
fraternities together took in about $1 million.125  In the spring of 1995, 
however, Hamilton abruptly promulgated a new policy, announcing that all 
students in its small town would be required to purchase housing and 
 
 117. Id. 
 118. See id. at 422–23. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Numerous other lawsuits have been lodged challenging parietal rules on Fourteenth 
Amendment grounds with varying degrees of success, but review of these would depart 
overfar from the focus on the antitrust lens.  See Mandatory Housing Requirements, supra 
note 2. 
 121. See, e.g., Manley, supra note 15, at 1–2 (summarizing Bauer’s “thorough” 
treatment of Hamilton College). 
 122. Hamilton Chapter of Alpha Delta Phi, Inc. v. Hamilton Coll., 128 F.3d 59, 61 (2d 
Cir. 1997); see also Hamilton Chapter of Alpha Delta Phi, Inc. v. Hamilton Coll., 106 F. 
Supp. 2d 406, 407 (N.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 123. Hamilton Coll., 128 F.3d at 61; see also Hamilton Coll., 106 F. Supp. 2d at 407, 
409. 
 124. See Bauer, supra note 1, at 368–69. 
 125. Hamilton Coll., 128 F.3d at 61. 
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dining services from the college as of the autumn term.126  In service of the 
new policy, Hamilton offered to purchase the chapterhouses of fraternities 
that could no longer use them to house students.127  Claiming violations of 
the Sherman Act, four fraternities sued under the theory that the college 
was attempting to monopolize the housing market, exact supracompetitive 
rental prices, and extort their valuable real estate at below-market prices.128 
Hamilton moved to dismiss, arguing that the alteration to its 
residential policy was noncommercial, or at least unrelated to interstate 
commerce, and thus beyond the scope of the Sherman Act.129  The college 
introduced evidence to show that its purpose was pedagogical, seeking to 
curb the power of a male-dominated Greek system that it believed was 
making the campus less desirable to female applicants, as well as 
cultivating a reputation for providing an environment more focused on 
social than academic pursuits.130  Other evidence, however, indicated that 
Hamilton’s aim, like Lycoming’s, was to fill empty dormitories and pay 
down debt incurred from their renovation.131  The district court, however, 
disregarded the materials submitted by both sides, instead finding that the 
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the Act by the nature of the 
college as an educational institution.132  The fraternities appealed. 
The Second Circuit first recited the generous standards afforded 
plaintiffs in a motion to dismiss, including the benefit of all reasonable 
inferences and the assumption that properly pled allegations are true.133  
The court then conducted a concise but exhaustive survey of competition 
law in the college context, ranging from early cases applying antitrust 
doctrine to non-profits to holdings like Brown University and Temple 
University, making due note of American National Bank as “the only 
reported case involving an antitrust challenge to a university housing policy 
 
 126. Id.; Hamilton Coll., 106 F. Supp. 2d at 407–08; see Robert E. Manley, Antitrust 
Claim Reinstated at Hamilton College, FRATERNAL L., Nov. 1997, at 3. 
 127. Hamilton Coll., 128 F.3d at 61. 
 128. Id. at 61–62; id. at 66 (“They allege that Hamilton adopted the residential policy for 
the commercial purpose of raising revenues by (1) forcing all Hamilton students to purchase 
residential services from Hamilton; (2) allowing Hamilton to raise its prices for such 
services; and (3) attempting to purchase the fraternity houses at below-market prices.”); 
Hamilton Coll., 106 F. Supp. 2d at 407; Manley, supra note 126, at 3. 
 129. Hamilton Coll., 128 F.3d at 62; Hamilton Coll., 106 F. Supp. 2d at 407. 
 130. Hamilton Coll., 128 F.3d at 61; see also Hamilton Coll., 106 F. Supp. 2d at 407. 
 131. See Hamilton Coll., 128 F.3d at 61; Bauer, supra note 1, at 371; Manley, supra note 
126, at 3. 
 132. Hamilton Coll., 128 F.3d at 62; Hamilton Coll., 106 F. Supp. 2d at 407. 
 133. Hamilton Coll., 128 F.3d at 62–63. 
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requiring certain students to live in university residence halls.”134  Taking 
as true the fraternities’ allegations of competitive exploitation and that the 
college’s proffered rationale was merely a pretext,135 the Second Circuit 
straightforwardly reversed and remanded to the district court.136 
On remand, the judge sua sponte bifurcated the case, directing the 
parties to conduct circumscribed discovery only on the proper definition of 
the relevant market, opining that “there appear to exist serious questions as 
to whether plaintiffs have adequately plead the relevant product and 
geographic markets in the first instance.”137  As intimated by this invitation, 
the court went on to grant summary judgment to the college.138  Hamilton 
successfully argued that the correct market encompassed all colleges that 
were “reasonably interchangeable” with Hamilton itself, not the market for 
residential housing in Clinton, New York.139  According to the court, this 
was because “[p]rospective students who do not find Hamilton’s housing 
policy attractive are free to choose to attend a different college.”140  And 
there was no dispute that Hamilton possessed no market power in 
competing for students with other schools.141 
The court justified its holding by observing rather tautologically that 
“[s]tudents do not—indeed cannot—shop separately for individual college 
services or characteristics, but rather must select one college which offers a 
group of services and qualities.”142  True, under Hamilton’s new policy, 
students could not, but that begs the central question of the case: whether 
the new policy disallowing students the option of choosing a Hamilton 
education without Hamilton housing was anticompetitive.143  There was 
certainly no infeasibility from a logistical perspective; before Hamilton’s 
change of heart, students had shopped for these services separately,144 and 
 
 134. Id. at 64–65 (citing Am. Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co. of Chi. v. Bd. of Regents for 
Regency Univs., 607 F. Supp. 845 (N.D. Ill. 1984)); see also Manley, supra note 126, at 3 
(discussing the Second Circuit’s analysis). 
 135. Id. at 66. 
 136. Id. at 67–68.  The court expressed no view on the merits of the alleged Sherman Act 
violation.  Id. at 67 n.3. 
 137. Hamilton Coll., 106 F. Supp. 2d at 408. 
 138. Id. at 413–14. 
 139. Id. at 413. 
 140. Id. at 412. 
 141. Id. at 413. 
 142. Id. at 412. 
 143. See Hamilton Chapter of Alpha Delta Phi, Inc. v. Hamilton Coll., 128 F.3d 59, 60–
61 (2d Cir. 1997) (detailing plaintiffs’ allegations). 
 144. Hamilton Coll., 106 F. Supp. 2d at 408 (“Until September 1995, residential services 
were provided to Hamilton students by a number of fraternities and private landlords in the 
Clinton, New York area, as well as by Hamilton. Thereafter, all students have been required 
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to the extent they selected Hamilton as their landlord, they were billed for 
residential services independently from educational tuition.145  The court’s 
unblinking acceptance that a practice that the market had followed for 
hundreds of years had suddenly become impossible defies the standard for 
summary judgment that there be no genuine issue for trial, resolving all 
ambiguities in the non-moving party’s favor.146 
The court’s prescription that prospective students opted for 
Hamilton’s mandatory residential policies with eyes wide open also 
ignored the plight of current students at the time the policy was announced, 
who most certainly had not.  Unfortunately, the plaintiffs had pled their 
market as “residential services for students matriculating at Hamilton 
College,”147 which the court interpreted as referring only to prospective 
students.148 The court thus discounted as immaterial the plaintiffs’ cogent 
argument that “after completing their first year at Hamilton, students have a 
substantial investment in continuing to attend Hamilton, such that they 
would not transfer to other colleges as a result of an increase in housing 
costs or a decrease in housing quality.”149  From the perspective of 
prospective students, Hamilton had changed the product it was offering, but 
the court was convinced that those choosing amongst colleges would 
consider Hamilton’s new policy and make an educated choice.150  The idea 
of existing students (or, for that matter, existing fraternities) being locked 
into Hamilton College went largely undeveloped. 
 
to live in college-owned facilities and to purchase college-sponsored meal plans.”); see 
Hamilton Coll., 128 F.3d at 61. 
 145. Hamilton Coll., 106 F. Supp. 2d at 408 (“The expense of residential services has 
always been a separate charge from tuition.”). 
 146. Id. at 410–11. 
 147. Id. at 412. 
 148. See id. at 412 n.6 (“Although plaintiffs submit evidence that, after completing their 
first year at Hamilton, students have a substantial financial incentive to remain there to 
complete their college education, the Court does not consider this a relevant factor in 
defining the relevant market. Hamilton announced its new residential policy in Spring 1995. 
Since that time, all prospective students have been able to consider Hamilton’s residential 
policy and its economic impact in deciding which college to attend.”); e.g., id. at 412 
(“Plaintiffs’ proposed market definition, which is too narrow to take into account the ability 
of prospective students to choose to enroll elsewhere, fails to include all reasonably 
interchangeable or substitutable products.”). 
 149. Id. at 413 (“[A]ll prospective students have been able to consider Hamilton’s policy 
in deciding which college to attend.”). 
 150. Id. at 412. 
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3. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services 
Before turning to the next college case, consider a brief diversion by 
way of a thought experiment: suppose a consumer is considering investing 
in one of the expensive optical SLR cameras favored by some photography 
enthusiasts.  There have undoubtedly been many competitors in that market 
over the years: Canon, Nikon, Panasonic, Sony, Fujifilm, and Kodak have 
all offered distinct products that afforded consumers different price points 
and features.  Once that choice is made, however, the consumer has a 
substantial cost sunk into that device’s ecosystem, also known as an 
aftermarket.  That is, if one has purchased a Kodak camera, one must now 
buy lenses compatible with the Kodak, replace broken parts with Kodak 
equipment, and contract with repairmen who can service Kodak products.  
The lifetime costs of all of these secondary services are not trivial.151 
Given the aftermarket for demonstrably wealthy consumers who 
possess Kodak cameras, there should be robust rivalry to provide these 
services.  But what if Kodak could keep anyone but its own agents from 
participating in this market for camera-specific services?  That could 
provide a lucrative monopoly for Kodak, since eliminating competition 
might allow Kodak to charge higher prices for the necessary lenses, parts, 
and services.  Even if it did not raise prices, Kodak would presumably earn 
more with one hundred percent of the aftermarket than just a portion.  But 
would Kodak’s aftermarket monopoly be bad for consumers?  Perhaps 
consumers would evaluate the whole ecosystem when purchasing the 
camera in the first place, and thus any competitive effects would be 
incorporated in the original choice amongst robustly competing options.  
Or, perhaps, enforcing a Kodak-only ecosystem would prove beneficial in 
the balance, by providing a well-curated and more attractive deal for 
consumers.  Or, perhaps, the sales of cameras, parts, and repairs are all so 
closely interlinked that they cannot be separated into discrete markets.152 
 
 151. See generally Jiaxuan Li, Gateway Products in the DSLR Camera Market: Dynamic 
Demand, Consumer Learning and Switching Costs (Jan. 7, 2016) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Boston University), http://people.bu.edu/jxli/files/jiaxuanli-dslr.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/96RB-DJ8G]; e.g., Eric Pfanner, Fujifilm Finds Niche With Old-Style 
Cameras That Mask a High-Tech Core, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 19, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/20/business/international/as-digital-camera-sales-sputter-
fujifilm-finds-its-niche.html? [https://perma.cc/TT23-PRN2]; Daisuke Wakabayashi, A New 
Focus for Camera Makers, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 15, 2012, 7:04 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304444604577342094118995830 [https://
perma.cc/2B9C-YH2V]. 
 152. See Li, supra note 151. 
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Such was the dilemma in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical 
Services, Inc., decided by the Supreme Court in 1992.153  There, Kodak had 
successfully sought to dominate the aftermarket for servicing its 
photocopiers by refusing to sell replacement parts to competing 
independent service organizations—which some customers had favored as 
being of higher quality than Kodak’s in-house services.154  These 
organizations brought suit under both clauses of the Sherman Act, alleging 
that Kodak had illegally tied the sales of machine parts to servicing in order 
to monopolize the aftermarket for Kodak photocopier servicing.155  Yet 
Kodak enjoyed no dominant power in the primary market for photocopiers 
itself.  If consumers did not like Kodak’s control of the aftermarket, they 
could always decline to patronize Kodak in the first place, or so the district 
court must have reasoned in granting summary judgment in favor of 
Kodak.156  The Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that competition in the 
primary market for copying equipment might not restrain anticompetitive 
behavior in the aftermarket for replacement parts and service, and that 
“sufficient evidence existed to support a finding that Kodak’s 
implementation of its parts policy was ‘anticompetitive’ and ‘exclusionary’ 
and ‘involved a specific intent to monopolize.’”157 
The Supreme Court affirmed by a 7–2 majority.  As far as the “tying” 
of the two items—that is, tethering Kodak’s near-monopoly on replacement 
parts for Kodak machines to the market for servicing Kodak machines—the 
Court held that to plead an antitrust violation, the tied markets must be 
distinct enough that it was reasonable for participants to operate in each 
market discretely, and yet the two had nonetheless been tied.158  This the 
Court easily found on the alleged facts.159  The question then became 
whether the primary market for the photocopiers necessarily prevented 
Kodak from exercising dominant power in the aftermarket, which proved a 
knotty question but one answered in the negative: even robust primary 
market competition may still allow for domination of an aftermarket.160  
The Court reasoned that it is costly (and sometimes impossible) for 
 
 153. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992). 
 154. Id. at 456–58. 
 155. Id. at 459. 
 156. Id. at 459.  That was the reasoning adopted by the dissent at the Ninth Circuit in 
favor of affirming the district court, in any event.  Id. at 461; see Image Tech. Servs., Inc. v. 
Eastman Kodak Co., 903 F.2d 612, 621–24 (9th Cir. 1990) (Wallace, J., dissenting), aff’d, 
504 U.S. 451 (1992). 
 157. Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 461 (quoting Eastman Kodak, 903 F.2d at 620). 
 158. Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 462. 
 159. Id. at 463. 
 160. Id. at 465–74. 
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consumers to fully educate themselves about the lifetime costs of a product 
a priori, and those less sophisticated may be particularly unable to do so.161 
As for monopolization, the Court rejected out-of-hand Kodak’s claim 
that sales of aftermarket services particular to a single brand per se could 
“never be a relevant market under the Sherman Act.”162  Distinguishing 
earlier precedent that found a single brand ecosystem is not necessarily its 
own market, the Court stressed that the issue remained substitutability and 
that plaintiffs had adequately alleged that there were no suitable substitutes 
for Kodak parts and service, since no other parts or services would fit 
Kodak devices.163  Indeed, the Court could cite a litany of lower court 
decisions defining a market limited to a single brand ecosystem.164  The 
result turned on whether Kodak had a legitimate reason for monopolizing 
the market, or whether it acted “to foreclose competition, to gain a 
competitive advantage, or to destroy a competitor,” presenting an 
eminently triable issue.165  Plaintiffs were thus entitled to proceed with their 
claims that Kodak was illegally shutting them out of the aftermarket,166 
eventually obtaining a $71.7 million verdict against Kodak after proving to 
a jury their allegations of anticompetitive behavior.167 
4. Hack v. President & Fellows of Yale College 
Eastman Kodak’s views of tying and aftermarket monopolization have 
not been without their detractors,168 including on the Supreme Court 
itself,169 but as one judge recently reminded, the opinion remains the “law 
 
 161. Id. at 474–77; see also Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 15 
n.24 (1984) (“Especially where market imperfections exist, purchasers may not be fully 
sensitive to the price or quality implications of a tying arrangement, and hence it may 
impede competition on the merits (citing Richard Craswell, Tying Requirements in 
Competitive Markets: The Consumer Protection Issues, 62 B.U. L. REV. 661, 675–79 
(1982))). 
 162. Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 481. 
 163. Id. at 482–83. 
 164. See id. at 482 n.31. 
 165. Id. at 483–85 (quoting United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948)). 
 166. Id. at 485–86. 
 167. See Image Tech. Serv., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 136 F.3d 1354, 1356 (9th Cir. 
1998) (“More than two years later, on September 19, 1995, a unanimous jury returned a 
verdict in favor of Image Tech and the other ISO plaintiffs, and awarded $23,948,300 in 
damages. After the trebling mandated by the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15, the damages 
award was $71.7 million.”). 
 168. See, e.g., Michael S. Jacobs, Market Power Through Imperfect Information: The 
Staggering Implications of Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services and a Modest 
Proposal for Limiting Them, 52 MD. L. REV. 336 (1993). 
 169. See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 486 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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of the land” and the leading case on point.170  Indeed, it would not be much 
exaggeration to call it one of the more eminent antitrust decisions of recent 
times.171  It was thus less than a decade before the first attempted 
application of its tying and aftermarket logic to college residential cases 
appeared in Hack v. President & Fellows of Yale College.172  Yale imposed 
a familiar parietal rule on its enrollees: all freshmen and sophomores were 
required to live in college housing, except for those married or over 
twenty-one years of age.173  Plaintiffs, for religious reasons, refused to live 
in coeducational housing and therefore sought a waiver, which was 
denied.174  They were therefore obliged to pay for rooms they could not 
occupy even as they sought off-campus, single-sex housing arrangements, 
and filed suit.175 
Plaintiffs alleged two antitrust violations analogous to Eastman 
Kodak.  First, the plaintiffs claimed that Yale had illegally tied provision of 
a Yale education to housing in the New Haven market.176  In sum, they 
argued that a Yale education was so unique that it formed a relevant market 
of its own and therefore that forcing unwanted housing on those who 
wished to obtain a Yale degree was an unlawful exercise of market power 
in violation of antitrust precedent.177 The court was unswayed by plaintiff’s 
appeal that “a Yale degree is of incomparable value to potential employers 
and to graduate schools and that only a Yale degree provides unique 
lifetime advantages, including access to the worldwide network of Yale 
alumni,”178 instead looking to precedent holding that the proper market was 
 
 170. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Terix Comp. Co., No. 5:13-cv-03385-PSG, 2014 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 158060, at *15 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2014). 
 171. See, e.g., id. at *14 (“seminal tying case”); Harrison Aire, Inc. v. Aerostar Int’l., 
Inc., 316 F. Supp. 2d 186, 214 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (“leading Supreme Court decision”); Delta 
Kappa Epsilon Alumni Corp. v. Colgate Univ., 492 F. Supp. 2d 106, 115 (N.D.N.Y. 2007) 
(“landmark case”); Josh Baskin, Note, Competitive Regulation of Mobile Software Systems: 
Promoting Innovation Through Reform of Antitrust and Patent Laws, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 
1727, 1734 (2013) (“seminal tying case”). 
 172. Hack v. President & Fellows of Yale Coll., 16 F. Supp. 2d 183 (D. Conn. 1998), 
aff’d, 237 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 173. Id. at 186. 
 174. Id. at 186–87. 
 175. Id. at 187.  In addition to the antitrust claims discussed herein, plaintiffs also alleged 
violation of the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments, violation of the Fair Housing 
Act, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment.  Id. at 186. 
 176. Id. at 195 (“The amended complaint alleges that ‘by conditioning the provision of a 
Yale education on the purchase of unrelated housing services, the defendants are engaged in 
an illegal restraint of trade’, which is in violation of Section One of the Sherman Antitrust 
Act.”). 
 177. Id. at 194. 
 178. Id. 
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the set of all elite universities to which excellent students might aspire.179  
Absent market power in a primary market for higher education, reasoned 
the court, Yale could not be guilty of illegal tying.180 
Plaintiffs also claimed that Yale had monopolized the aftermarket for 
“Yale student housing,” which they claimed was an adequate definition 
given that no other housing was reasonably interchangeable with Yale’s 
provided dormitories in light of the school’s parietal rule.181  The court was 
again unswayed, citing the analogous Rohlfing v. Manor Care, Inc.,182 in 
which the plaintiffs had claimed a nursing home’s rule requiring residents 
to use a specified medication provider monopolized that aftermarket.183  
The Rohlfing court dismissed because “if the residents were not satisfied 
with the pharmaceutical services or prices they could have selected a 
different nursing home.”184  Similarly, the Yale College court dismissed 
because “plaintiffs could have opted to attend a different college or 
university if they were not satisfied with Yale’s housing policy,” given the 
court’s prior ruling that Yale did not comprise a unique market of its 
own.185 
The failure of Yale College’s plaintiffs to escape dismissal likely lies 
in the facts.  It is intuitive to picture Kodak using its monopoly over 
replacement parts to eliminate competition from independent servicers; 
imagining Yale as wielding a monopoly in more intangible educational 
services is more challenging.  Beyond inartful pleading, however, the tying 
and aftermarket claims are much the same.  Yale competed with other 
purveyors of education, and consumers made their choices.  Once the 
choice was made, however, Yale had locked-in consumers who could only 
use Yale-supplied educational offerings, just as Kodak had locked-in 
consumers who could only use Kodak-supplied parts.186  In an open 
aftermarket for dormitory services, both Yale and private lessors would 
presumably offer options.  By using its power over its already-enrolled 
 
 179. Id. at 195. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at 196. 
 182. Rohlfing v. Manor Care, Inc., 172 F.R.D. 330, 347 & n.23 (N.D. Ill. 1997). 
 183. Id. at 333–34. 
 184. Yale Coll., 16 F. Supp. 2d at 196 (citing Rohlfing, 172 F.R.D. at 346). 
 185. Id. at 197. 
 186. Of course, a student at Yale could theoretically abandon his commitment to Yale 
and undertake the costly process of adopting a new university, just as the owner of a Kodak 
device could abandon the use of that device and instead pay the cost of a new competing 
device.  But the presence of these so-called “switching costs” are precisely what being 
“locked-in” means.  See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Serv., Inc., 504 U.S. 451,   
473–477 (1992). 
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students, however, Yale was able to enforce rules on the supply of its 
educational services—they would only be given to those who use Yale 
housing—that forced students to buy their housing.  This is 
indistinguishable in principle from Kodak enforcing rules on the supply of 
its replacement parts—they would only be given to those who used Kodak 
repair services—that forced consumers to buy their repair services.  
Advising Yale students that they should choose a different college would 
be like telling Kodak owners they should choose a different photocopier: 
the very argument the Supreme Court had thoroughly rejected at the 
summary judgment stage.187 
On appeal, the Second Circuit reiterated skepticism of the antitrust 
claims but illuminated the reason further.188  The court again waved away 
the argument that Yale was unique, repeating that if plaintiffs “were 
dissatisfied with the Yale parietal rules, they could matriculate 
elsewhere.”189  The court then offered a telling observation: 
  Hamilton Chapter of Alpha Delta Phi, Inc. v. Hamilton College, supra, 
is not to the contrary.  The court there never reached the relevant market 
issue, and, if it had, the considerations would have been quite different.  
Plaintiffs in Hamilton were “locked in” by their investment in housing 
which they could no longer use because of an abrupt change in policy.  
That might have raised the concerns voiced in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image 
Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992), but those concerns are not 
present here.  Yale’s housing policies were fully disclosed long before 
plaintiffs applied for admission.  They had no “lock-in” costs.190 
In reality, the court of appeals explained, Yale students were not 
unfairly locked in at all.191  In Eastman Kodak, the Supreme Court 
expressed concern that consumers, particularly unsophisticated ones, would 
be unable or unwilling to analyze the long-term costs of the Kodak 
ecosystem they were adopting and thereby become locked in 
unwittingly.192  Disregarding this concern, the Yale College court implicitly 
found the opposite: the adolescents deciding amongst colleges were 
sophisticated enough to factor in the “fully disclosed” conditions of 
housing prior to matriculating.193  At least, however, in distinguishing 
Hamilton College, the Yale College rule discriminates between consumers 
who notionally make a decision a priori as to their alma mater (warts, 
 
 187. See id. at 464–77. 
 188. See Hack v. President & Fellows of Yale Coll., 237 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 189. Id. at 86–87. 
 190. Id. at 87. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 474–77. 
 193. Yale Coll., 237 F.3d at 86–87. 
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parietal rules, and all) and a fraternity locked into a residential market long 
ago that is only now being excluded by a dominant market power wielding 
monopolistic parietal rules. 
It is ironic, however, that the Second Circuit referenced Hamilton 
College’s failure to reach the relevant market issue.194  In fact, by the time 
the appellate decision in Yale College was released, the Hamilton College 
district court had already ruled (six months earlier) that its plaintiffs had 
failed to properly define a relevant market for exactly the same reasons 
enunciated in Yale College: namely, that other colleges were 
interchangeable with Hamilton, with no intimation of any Eastman Kodak 
analysis.195  Had only the Hamilton College district court the benefit of the 
Second Circuit’s wisdom in Yale College, “the considerations”—and 
perhaps the result—“would have been quite different.”196 
5. Delta Kappa Epsilon Alumni Corp. v. Colgate University 
When Bauer published his article in 2004, he could comment that 
Hamilton College “is the only case ever to consider the issues discussed in 
this article.”197  That is no longer true, and whilst it is fitting that the sequel 
case should arise at Colgate University, which Bauer described as 
Hamilton’s “chief rival,”198 it is unfortunate that the sequel should fall into 
the same ruts of confusion as its predecessor.  This is particularly so in light 
of the Second Circuit’s guidance in the interim from Yale College that 
fraternities with locked-in interests in residential property may well obtain 
protections under the Supreme Court’s Eastman Kodak holding in the face 
of an “abrupt change in policy.”199  Given direction from authority at the 
appellate level and the Supreme Court, it is difficult to see where a district 
court might go awry. 
Yet Delta Kappa Epsilon Alumni Corp. v. Colgate University did just 
that, to all appearances.200  Following an automobile accident in 2000, 
Colgate University undertook a systematic reappraisal of its residential 
 
 194. Id. at 87. 
 195. Hamilton Chapter of Alpha Delta Phi, Inc. v. Hamilton Coll., 106 F. Supp. 2d 406, 
412–13 (N.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 196. Yale Coll., 237 F.3d at 87. 
 197. Bauer, supra note 1, at 350. 
 198. Bauer, supra note 1, at 381.  It is wryly amusing to note that Hamilton College is 
located in Clinton, New York, while its archrival Colgate University is located in Hamilton, 
New York. 
 199. Yale Coll., 237 F.3d at 87. 
 200. Delta Kappa Epsilon Alumni Corp. v. Colgate Univ., 492 F. Supp. 2d 106 
(N.D.N.Y. 2007). 
29
Sunshine: Antitrust Precedent & Anti-Fraternity Sentiment: Revisiting Hamil
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2017
88 CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:1 
programs.201  As part of the resulting scheme, Colgate resolved to require 
every student to live in college-owned housing; to accomplish this, Colgate 
would derecognize any fraternity that refused to sell its property to Colgate, 
thus allowing Colgate to become the sole provider of residential services.202  
Colgate implemented its program, and most fraternities capitulated in 
exchange for continued recognition, but when Delta Kappa Epsilon 
refused, Colgate derecognized it, which had the effect of prohibiting the 
fraternity from enrolling new members from the student body on penalty of 
those members’ expulsion from the university.203  The Delta Kappa Epsilon 
alumni association, which owned the fraternity house, filed suit under the 
Sherman Act, alleging monopolization of the market for residential housing 
around Colgate.204 
The district court decided the case for Colgate on a motion for 
summary judgment, after taking evidence from two experts.205  The court 
appeared to accept that under the Eastman Kodak analysis, there could be 
multiple markets: a competitive primary market for tertiary education in 
which Colgate vied against other liberal arts institutions and a potentially 
non-competitive aftermarket for residential housing.206  The question, as in 
Eastman Kodak, was whether the competition in the primary market 
restrained Colgate from exercising dominant power in the associated 
housing aftermarket once students were locked into its educational 
forum.207  There, the Supreme Court discerned strong evidence of 
aftermarket power, such as supracompetitive pricing, dominant share, and 
 
 201. Id. at 107; Michelle York, Colgate Gains Ground in Legal Battle with Fraternities, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/13/education/colgate-gains-
ground-in-legal-battle-with-fraternities.html [https://perma.cc/3QML-8VQ7]. 
 202. Colgate Univ., 492 F. Supp. 2d at 108; Robert E. Manley, Delta Kappa Epsilon 
Sues Colgate, FRATERNAL L., Mar. 2005, at 1; York, supra note 201. 
 203. Colgate Univ., 492 F. Supp. 2d at 108; York, supra note 201 (“All but one of the 
Greek-letter organizations turned over their property by this summer. Nearly all of the 
university’s 2,750 students now live in buildings where campus officials can provide some 
oversight. A sole Greek-letter organization, Delta Kappa Epsilon, did not sell. It was 
derecognized. Colgate students are not permitted to live there or to participate in that 
fraternity’s activities. If they do, they face disciplinary action, including expulsion.”). 
 204. Colgate Univ., 492 F. Supp. 2d at 107. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. at 114–16. 
 207. See id. at 116 (“Kodak does not transform every possessor of a dominant share in 
the relevant aftermarket into a monopolist.  Indeed, ‘[t]o create a triable question of 
aftermarket monopoly power, the plaintiff must produce “hard evidence dissociating the 
competitive situation in the aftermarket from activities occurring in the primary market.”’” 
(citation omitted) (quoting Harrison Aire, Inc. v. Aerostar Int’l, Inc., 423 F.3d 374, 383 (3d 
Cir. 2005))). 
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“switching costs”;208 such evidence carried the day in the eventual 
verdict.209  Equally clearly, Colgate had not been restrained by decreased 
enrollment from the complete eradication of every competitor: even starker 
evidence of power.210  And such an eradication is powerful prima facie 
evidence that Colgate’s aim was “to destroy a competitor” under § 2 of the 
Sherman Act.211  Such considerations should have convinced the court that 
summary judgment was inappropriate, whatever the ultimate merits of the 
case.212 
The court strayed further, however, in its analysis of Delta Kappa 
Epsilon’s strongest argument: the abrupt shift in residential policy 
specifically victimized locked-in participants in the local housing market.213  
Citing Hamilton College, the court found the abrupt change in policy 
irrelevant and existing students’ inability to readily transfer out 
immaterial.214  This astonishing result purportedly followed because 
students matriculating at the college entered into an implied contract to 
abide by Colgate’s parietal rules, whatever they might be in the future.215  
Even if Colgate’s New Residential Program was unforeseeable a priori, 
and students were compelled to accept it in light of onerous costs in 
switching out of Colgate, they were evidently contractually bound to 
 
 208. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Serv., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 465–74 (1992); 
Colgate Univ., 492 F. Supp. 2d at 115–16 (discussing Eastman Kodak’s findings). 
 209. See supra note 167 and accompanying text. 
 210. See Colgate Univ., 492 F. Supp. 2d at 110 (noting increased applications for 
enrollment correlated to elimination of residential competitors).  There were differing 
theories for what the burgeoning enrollment meant: one expert declared it an indication that 
Colgate’s offering was a pro-competitive improved product, id. at 110, whilst the other 
expert explained it was because high school students were unable to discern the lifetime 
costs of their education.  Id. at 111.  Such disputed questions of fact are precisely why 
summary judgment was inappropriate.  See Eastern Kodak, 504 U.S. at 486. 
 211. Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 483 (quoting United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 
107 (1948)). 
 212. See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 486 (“[W]e cannot reach these conclusions as a 
matter of law on a record this sparse. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals 
denying summary judgment is affirmed.”). 
 213. See Colgate Univ., 492 F. Supp. 2d at 116–17. 
 214. Id. at 116 (“As the Hamilton court remarked in regard to this very argument, this 
assertion, ‘even if true . . . is not material.’” (quoting Hamilton Coll., 106 F. Supp. 2d at 
413)). 
 215. See id. (“Any housing constraints experienced by students who have chosen to 
enroll despite the residential policy flow from their implied contract [with Colgate] to 
comply with its rules, including the residential policy.” (quoting Hamilton Coll., 106 F. 
Supp. 2d at 413)). 
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accede to Colgate’s every whim, however exploitative.216  Such an 
unconscionable outcome cannot be reconciled with Eastman Kodak’s 
healthy acceptance of the realities of competition in an aftermarket, which 
even Colgate University professed to acknowledge.217  Indeed, the rule that 
Colgate University recited specifically counseled solicitude to the 
fraternities’ position: “the decision in Kodak clarifies the relationship 
between an appropriately alleged market and aftermarket, holding that 
‘primary market competition does not necessarily preclude monopoly 
power in the relevant aftermarket where a unilateral policy change targets 
“locked-in” customers.’”218 
The court’s rationale for jettisoning Eastman Kodak and effectively 
indenturing Colgate’s students to the college, however, became apparent as 
it expanded on its reasoning: 
  Here, Colgate and its students enter into a unique contractual 
arrangement which governs both parties’ conduct during the tenure of their 
relationship. . . .  
  Once a student decides to enroll in a particular college, a unique and 
distinctive relationship commences between school and student that 
governs that student’s four-year tenure.  Over the next four years, an 
undergraduate student lives and studies in a “quasi-parented” environment, 
where the school, in loco parentis, creates and enforces policies for the 
protection and welfare of its students.  Here, Colgate has exercised these 
rights, namely, its “parietal” rights, in creating a residential policy that is 
part of a Colgate education.  As such, the court holds, as a matter of law, 
that Colgate’s residential policy is an effect of the exercise of its lawful and 
appropriate parietal rights.219 
Perplexingly, the court claimed that Yale College supported its 
position, explaining that “[t]he Second Circuit has previously visited this 
very issue.”220  Indeed it had: Yale College, it may be remembered, had 
written that plaintiffs like those at Hamilton (or Colgate) subjected to an 
abrupt change in policy that negated their investments in residential 
property may well have a claim under the logic of Eastman Kodak.221  
Needless to say, the Colgate University court did not cite that insight.  
 
 216. Without being overly flippant, such an unreasonable “contract” would quite literally 
be “in restraint of trade.”  See Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
 217. See Colgate Univ., 492 F. Supp. 2d at 116 (“In broad terms, Kodak stands for the 
proposition that market reality is the touchstone of antitrust analysis.” (quoting Harrison 
Aire, Inc., 423 F.3d at 383)). 
 218. Id. (quoting Harrison Aire, Inc., 423 F.3d at 383). 
 219. Colgate Univ., 492 F. Supp. 2d at 117 (citations omitted). 
 220. Id. at 116. 
 221. Hack v. President & Fellows of Yale Coll., 237 F.3d 81, 87 (2d Cir. 2000). 
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Instead, it repeated the observation that if prospective students did not 
approve of parietal rules, they could matriculate elsewhere.222  But as Yale 
College recognized, that holding would have no bearing on the existing 
students who had already matriculated at Colgate when the policy was 
implemented who were in a “quite different” posture.223  All the more so, 
the option to matriculate elsewhere was of no use at all to the Colgate 
University plaintiff itself, which as a local fraternity chapter had been 
“locked-in” to Colgate since its foundation and literally could not move 
anywhere else.  Fraternities themselves, captive to their host institutions, 
are the most defenseless targets of colleges’ attempts at complete control.224 
C. Collegiate Embargos on Fraternities 
The core leverage the university wielded against the fraternity system 
in the residential antitrust cases was recognition.225  By withholding that 
recognition and forbidding its students from associating with unrecognized 
groups, the university could starve rogue chapters into submission.226  The 
alternative, presumably adopted by at least some ostensibly extinct 
chapters, is to go “underground”227: to return to the strict secrecy that 
characterized their earliest days, where colleges similarly threatened 
students with expulsion for affiliation.228  Even the mere threat of 
derecognition has been widely successful in coercing most fraternities into 
selling their most valuable resources, their chapterhouses, in hopes of 
simply being allowed to continue existing, albeit in a diminished and 
noncompetitive state.229 
 
 222. Colgate Univ., 492 F. Supp. 2d at 117. 
 223. Yale Coll., 237 F.3d at 87. 
 224. See infra Section IV.B; Bauer, supra note 1, at 510–12. 
 225. See, e.g., Colgate Univ., 492 F. Supp. 2d at 108. 
 226. See York, supra note 201 (“As part of the plan, [Colgate] told its Greek-letter 
organizations that if they did not turn over their houses to the college, the fraternities and 
sororities would not be recognized—meaning the end of all their activities.”); Fraternities 
Go Underground to Defy College Ban, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 29, 1994), http://www.
nytimes.com/1994/08/29/us/fraternities-go-underground-to-defy-college-ban.html [https://
perma.cc/P5GM-68B2]. 
 227. See, e.g., Fraternities Go Underground, supra note 226; Phelps v. President & Trs. 
of Colby Coll., 595 A.2d 403, 403–04 (Me. 1991); Gosk, supra note 8, at 167–68 (detailing 
Colby College’s attempts to root out “underground fraternities” after the school officially 
banned such organizations). 
 228. See supra notes 21–25 and accompanying text; see, e.g., People ex rel. Pratt v. 
Wheaton Coll., 40 Ill. 186 (Ill. 1866) (student expelled for joining secret society). 
 229. See supra Section II.B; e.g., York, supra note 201 (“If they sold or donated their 
houses, students could still belong to the [fraternal] organizations and still live in the houses, 
though the college would essentially supervise them.”). 
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1. Greek Nonrecognition as an Antitrust Issue 
But universities brandish the stick of nonrecognition more broadly 
than simply to stifle robust residential housing markets.230  The university’s 
purported control of its student population would allow it to act as a 
unilateral gatekeeper to its market, refusing to allow any particular new 
group access to students in order to compete with incumbents.231  
Suggestions that a fraternity chapter could simply operate elsewhere defy 
the basic definition of a fraternity vis-à-vis undergraduates.232  Universities 
may simply be favoring those groups who conform to the college’s 
expectations of academic rigor and extracurricular probity,233 or more 
actively manipulating the supply conditions for other services fraternities 
provide.234  The motivation for manipulation can be self-evident: a college 
desirous of providing dining facilities in exchange for additional fees from 
students, for example, would benefit from eliminating fraternity 
competitors who might seek to offer competing dining options of higher 
quality or at lower prices.235 
 
 230. See Robert E. Manley, Antitrust Laws Affect the Campus, FRATERNAL L., Nov. 
1995, at 3 (“Any arrangement that excludes access of a particular fraternity to a particular 
campus without approval of the campus IFC or the campus Panhellenic probably violates 
the antitrust laws.”). 
 231. See Sunshine, Fraternity as Franchise, supra note 3, at 405–06; Manley, supra note 
230, at 3 (“Policies of colleges to exclude particular fraternities unless they have campus 
IFC or campus Panhellenic approval probably violate antitrust laws.”); Robert E. Manley, 
New Risks Facing Campus IFCs and Panhellenic Conferences, FRATERNAL L., Jan. 1992, at 
4–5 (“When a campus IFC or Panhellenic votes to recommend that the university not 
recognize a colony of a new group, it may be engaging in a conspiracy with the university 
to . . . violate the antitrust laws by restricting access to the campus market by a new 
group.”). 
 232. See, e.g., Psi Upsilon of Phila. v. Univ. of Pa., 591 A.2d 755, 761 (Pa. Super. 1991) 
(“The Recognition Policy to which appellant was signatory establishes the responsibility of 
the fraternity as an entity for acts of its members which have been determined to be 
improper. The result of such a conclusion is not appellants’ inability to function as the social 
organization it, in fact, is, but only its inability to function under the auspices of that 
institution whose rules its members have broken. No limitations have been placed upon its 
continued operation outside the University.”). 
 233. See, e.g., Beta Sigma Rho, Inc. v. Moore, 46 Misc. 2d 1030, 1033–34 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1965). 
 234. See Sunshine, Fraternity as Franchise, supra note 3, at 405. 
 235. See, e.g., Hamilton Chapter of Alpha Delta Phi, Inc. v. Hamilton Coll., 106 F. Supp. 
2d 406, 407 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (“Until September 1995, residential services were provided to 
Hamilton students by a number of fraternities and private landlords in the Clinton, New 
York area, as well as by Hamilton. Thereafter, all students have been required to . . . 
purchase college-sponsored meal plans.”); Cowboy Book Ltd. v. Bd. of Regents for Agric. 
& Mech. Colls. ex rel. Okla. State Univ. of Agric. & Applied Sci., 728 F. Supp. 1518, 1523 
(W.D. Okla. 1989) (quoted supra text accompanying note 89). 
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In their regulation of fraternities, universities often recite pieties about 
improving the lot of students generally by reducing social stratification, 
eliminating dangerous or disruptive influences, or creating a living 
environment consistent with the college’s ideological message.236  Surely, 
goes the argument, the university is bettering the competitive market by 
protecting consumers of educational services from social exclusion and 
psychic injury, eliminating participants who might harm consumers, or 
simply providing consumers with what the university thinks is best.237  
Colgate, indeed, argued strenuously that denying students the choice to 
patronize fraternities and unifying the provision of residential services 
under its control improved the educational experience,238 and the Colgate 
University court agreed that the school could act unilaterally “for the 
protection and welfare of its students.”239  But judges have heard similar 
reasoning from colleges before and should not be fooled: 
  “The argument is, in essence, that an unrestrained market in which 
consumers are given access to the information they believe to be relevant to 
their choices will lead them to make unwise and even dangerous choices.  
Such an argument amounts to ‘nothing less than a frontal assault on the 
basic policy of the Sherman Act.’” 
  Both the public safety justification rejected by the Supreme Court in 
Professional Engineers and the public health justification rejected by the 
Court in Indiana Dentists were based on the defendants’ faulty premise that 
consumer choices made under competitive market conditions are “unwise” 
or “dangerous.”240 
What rationale, in short, could justify completely removing the choice 
of where they reside from consumers themselves?  Colgate characterized 
its purportedly protecting students’ safety and health (apparently, from 
their own bad decisions) as “pro-competitive,”241 but that brand of lofty 
 
 236. See, e.g., Beta Sigma Rho, 46 Misc. 2d at 1033–34 (discussing report of the State 
University of New York explaining why national fraternities were deleterious to the campus 
population on each of these axes); see also Manley, supra note 230, at 3 (“Any arrangement 
that gives quotas to individual chapters on an individual campus probably violates the 
antitrust law. The fact that these arrangements are designed to encourage a wholesome 
Greek system or good educational opportunities is no defense.”). 
 237. See, e.g., Beta Sigma Rho, 46 Misc. 2d at 1033–34; Delta Kappa Epsilon Alumni 
Corp. v. Colgate Univ., 492 F. Supp. 2d 106, 116–17 (N.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 238. Colgate Univ., 492 F. Supp. 2d at 110. 
 239. Id. at 117. 
 240. United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 676–77 (3d Cir. 1993) (citation omitted) 
(quoting FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 463 (1986)). 
 241. Colgate Univ., 492 F. Supp. 2d at 110. 
35
Sunshine: Antitrust Precedent & Anti-Fraternity Sentiment: Revisiting Hamil
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2017
94 CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:1 
paternalism infantilizes and disenfranchises students qua market 
participants, making them effective wards of the university.242 
Indeed, incumbents can often lodge self-serving arguments about 
safety and traditional wisdom in support of their actions barring rivals from 
a market.243  Particularly where access to the market is highly regulated, 
barriers to entry may be raised so high as to prevent effective competition 
from interlopers.244  Such behavior is widely known as a form of 
rent-seeking:245 the practice by which organized incumbents importune 
lawmakers to hinder competition from others through licensure, board 
regulation, or quotas.246  To avoid unseemly appearances, the pretext for 
this legislation or regulation is often given as promoting public health and 
welfare.247  Yet even such obvious favoritism is problematic to challenge 
legally due to state-action Parker immunity;248 Parker itself condoned a 
sort of rent-seeking in allowing California to regulate the market for raisins 
 
 242. See supra note 219 and accompanying text. 
 243. E.g., FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986); Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l 
Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).  
 244. See, e.g., John S. Elson, The Governmental Maintenance of the Privileges of Legal 
Academia: A Case Study in Classic Rent-Seeking and a Challenge to Our Democratic 
Ideology, 15 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 269 (2001). 
 245. See id. at 270 (“Here, I define rent-seeking in a conventional, but very restricted 
sense, as the phenomenon by which a cartel obtains governmentally imposed restrictions on 
entry to the market in which the cartel members sell their goods or services in order that 
they can obtain higher profits than they otherwise would in open market competition.”); see 
also George F. Will, Op-Ed., Supreme Court has a chance to bring liberty to teeth 
whitening, WASH. POST (Oct. 10, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/george-
will-supreme-court-has-a-chance-to-promote-cleaner-competition/2014/10/10/13a3a2c0-4fd
8-11e4-babe-e91da079cb8a_story.html [https://perma.cc/52YH-DGKQ] (defining rent-
seeking as the “unseemly yet uninhibited scramble of private interests to bend government 
power for their benefit”). 
 246. Elson, supra note 244, at 269–72; Will, supra note 245 (“Today, factions enrich 
themselves through occupational licensure laws unrelated to public safety.  Such laws are 
growth-inhibiting and job-limiting, injuring the economy while corrupting politics.  They 
are residues of the mercantilist mentality, which was a residue of the feudal guild system, 
which was crony capitalism before there was capitalism.  Then as now, commercial interests 
collaborated with governments that protected them against competition.”). 
 247. E.g., Will, supra note 245 (The North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners 
“protects the economic interests of those who elect it, by pretending to protect North 
Carolinians from the supposed danger of unlicensed people participating in the business of 
‘teeth whitening.’”); Elson, supra note 244, at 273–76. 
 248. See William H. Page, Interest Groups, Antitrust, and State Regulation: Parker v. 
Brown in the Economic Theory of Legislation, 1987 DUKE L.J. 618, 619; Will, supra note 
245 (“When the Federal Trade Commission initiated an action against the dental board’s 
behavior, the board said it could not be found in violation of federal antitrust laws because it 
enjoys ‘Parker immunity.’”). 
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“so as to restrict competition among the growers and maintain prices in the 
distribution of their commodities to packers,” notwithstanding the Sherman 
Act.249  At the very least, private institutions should not accrue such 
prerogatives. 
This risk of anticompetitive results can be greatest where market 
participants act as the regulators for their own markets as, for example, 
Hamilton College argued it did in promulgating parietal rules for the 
student population.250  Based on purported authority for concerted action, 
self-regulators may try to claim immunity from antitrust laws.251  Absent 
statutory authority authorizing anticompetitive conduct, however, when 
self-regulating industries exclude competitors from the market, they are 
engaged in nothing more than a transparently unlawful boycott.252  And 
educators are assuredly held to task in some self-regulatory contexts, 
notably their athletic program cartels.253  Yet tension arises given          
cases holding that the quintessential expression of schools’ 
self-regulation—academic accreditation—is a non-commercial activity 
beyond the scope of antitrust law.254  In any event, the Second Circuit 
rejected the notion that the recognition of fraternities on campus 
categorically exceeds the reach of antitrust law.255 
2. Legal Precedent on Systemic Interdiction of Fraternities 
And yet, despite these lucid competitive concerns, the roll of cases 
considering universities’ rights to refuse to recognize fraternities (and expel 
students who join them) is uniform: Supreme Court justices to county court 
judges have afforded colleges untrammeled discretion to regulate the lives 
 
 249. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 346 (1943); see also Will, supra note 245. 
 250. See Bauer, supra note 1, at 373 n.210 (“Hamilton also argued that a college’s 
self-regulation was immune from antitrust scrutiny.  The antitrust laws, however, place a 
legislative limit on self-regulation which restrains trade.  See, e.g., Silver v. N. Y. Stock 
Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 360 (1963).  Accordingly, Hamilton’s status as a self-regulating 
organization was insufficient to defeat the fraternities’ complaint.  Hamilton Coll., 128 F.3d 
at 64.”). 
 251. See, e.g., Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963). 
 252. See HYLTON, supra note 46, at 166–85 (“Boycotts”); e.g., Nw. Wholesale Stationers 
v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284 (1985); Silver, 373 U.S. 341. 
 253. E.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984); NCAA v. 
Law, 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998). 
 254. See, e.g., Marjorie Webster Junior Coll., Inc. v. Middle States Assoc. of Coll. & 
Secondary Sch., Inc., 432 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970); Found. 
for Interior Design Educ. Research v. Savannah Coll. of Art & Design, 73 F. Supp. 2d 829 
(W.D. Mich. 1999). 
 255. Hamilton Chapter of Alpha Delta Phi, Inc. v. Hamilton Coll., 128 F.3d 59 (2d Cir. 
1997). 
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of their students and extirpate organizations that do not meet their approval, 
without so much as a footnote given over to antitrust implications.256  The 
first such case dates back to the middle of the nineteenth century,257 and the 
court’s own summary is as concise as any: “E. Hartley Pratt, a student in 
Wheaton college, joined a secret society known as the Good Templars, in 
violation of the college rules.  For this the faculty ‘suspended him from the 
privileges of the institution until he should express a purpose to conform to 
its rules.’”258  His father brought a suit for mandamus that his son be 
reinstated, but the court demurred, finding the college free to make 
whatever rules it wished for its governance.259  The student “has an 
undoubted legal right to join either Wheaton college or the Good 
Templars”260—but not both. 
The Supreme Court adopted like reasoning in Waugh v. Board of 
Trustees of University of Mississippi.261  There, the university had adopted 
measures that prohibited the enrollment or granting of degrees to anyone 
affiliated with a fraternity or sorority, and an applicant to the law school 
refused to sign the pledge that he was not so affiliated.262  Instead, he 
brought a lawsuit alleging the university had deprived him of liberty, 
property, and his rightful pursuit of happiness under the Fourteenth 
Amendment without due process of law.263  The Court was unpersuaded, 
concluding that such rights “are subject in some degree to the limitations of 
the law, and the condition upon which the State of Mississippi offers the 
complainant free instruction in its University, that while a student there he 
 
 256. See, e.g., Waugh v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Miss., 237 U.S. 589 (1915); Chi Iota 
Colony of Alpha Epsilon Pi Fraternity v. City Univ. of N.Y., 502 F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 2007); 
Pi Lambda Phi Fraternity, Inc. v. Univ. of Pitt., 229 F.3d 435 (3d Cir. 2000); Phi Kappa Tau 
Chapter House Ass’n of Miami Univ. v. Miami Univ., No. 1:12-CV-657, 2013 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 15030 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 4, 2013); Sigma Chi Fraternity v. Regents of the Univ. of 
Colo., 258 F. Supp. 515 (D. Colo. 1966); Webb v. State Univ. of N.Y., 125 F. Supp. 910 
(N.D.N.Y. 1954); Iowa Beta Chapter of Phi Delta Theta Fraternity v. State, 763 N.W.2d 250 
(Iowa 2009); Phelps v. President & Trs. of Colby Coll., 595 A.2.d 403 (Me. 1991); Beta 
Sigma Rho, Inc. v. Moore, 4 Misc. 2d 1030 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1965); Psi Upsilon of Phila. v. 
Univ. of Pa., 591 A.2d 755 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991); Mu Theta of Tau Kappa Epsilon v. 
Lycoming Coll., 75 Pa. D. & C. 2d 420 (Pa. Ct. C.P. 1976). 
 257. People ex rel. Pratt v. Wheaton Coll., 40 Ill. 186, 186 (Ill. 1866). 
 258. Id. 
 259. Id. 
 260. Id. at 188. 
 261. Waugh v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Miss., 237 U.S. 589 (1915). 
 262. Id. at 591–93. 
 263. Id. at 594. 
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renounce affiliation with a society which the state considers inimical to 
discipline.”264 
Such logic has featured in numerous other cases concerning state 
institutions.265  Judges have held that a state is free to delegate 
quasi-legislative powers to the regents overseeing the states’ educational 
institutions to set regulations as they see fit.266  Through these regulations, 
the “state may adopt such measures, including the outlawing of certain 
social organizations, as it deems necessary to its duty of supervision and 
control of its educational institutions.”267  This is particularly the case when 
the state excludes organizations that purportedly discriminate on the basis 
of protected classes, given the state’s constitutional duties.268  Even 
considered in light of competitive concerns, the logic is hard to assail, as 
the state enjoys immunity from antitrust liability in any event: if a state’s 
public policy is to disallow fraternities from competition, the Sherman Act 
cannot stop it.269  Whether the First and Fourteenth Amendments impose 
restraints on state action based on students’ freedom of association is a 
different and well-studied question.270 
But courts have also condoned private universities’ plenary privilege 
to interdict disfavored organizations.271  In Phelps v. President & Trustees 
of Colby College,272 the remaining members of the local chapter of Lambda 
 
 264. Id. at 597. 
 265. See, e.g., Webb v. State Univ. of N.Y., 125 F. Supp. 910 (N.D.N.Y. 1954); Beta 
Sigma Rho, Inc. v. Moore, 4 Misc. 2d 1030 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1965); Sigma Chi Fraternity v. 
Regents of the Univ. of Colo., 258 F. Supp. 515 (D. Colo. 1966). 
 266. Beta Sigma Rho, 4 Misc. 2d at 1035. 
 267. Webb, 125 F. Supp. at 912 (citing Waugh, 237 U.S. 589; Hughes v. Caddo Parish 
Sch. Bd., 57 F. Supp. 508 (W.D. La. 1944), aff’d, 65 S. Ct. 562 (1945)).  
 268. See, e.g., Sigma Chi Fraternity, 258 F. Supp. 515 (upholding state school’s ability 
to expel a fraternity that discriminated on the basis of race); Beta Sigma Rho, 4 Misc. 2d at 
1033–34 (“One of the pillars upon which State University of New York was founded is that 
educational opportunities be made available to those qualified, without regard to race, color, 
religion, creed or national origin. It would be sophistry for the State University to vigorously 
combat discrimination in its admissions and academic policies and, at the same time, 
condone those practices among the extracurricular organizations recognized by it.” (quoting 
a study of State University of New York fraternities and social organizations)). 
 269. See, e.g., supra note 265 and accompanying text. 
 270. See generally, e.g., Bauer, supra note 2; James C. Harvey, Fraternities and the 
Constitution: University-Imposed Relationship Statements May Violate Student 
Associational Rights, 17 J.C. & U.L. 11 (1990); Gregory F. Hauser, Social Fraternities at 
Public Institutions of Higher Education: Their Rights Under the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments, 19 J.L. & EDUC. 433 (1990); Gosk, supra note 8. 
 271. See, e.g., Psi Upsilon of Phila. v. Univ. of Pa., 591 A.2d 755, 762 (Pa. Super. 1991); 
People ex rel. Pratt v. Wheaton Coll., 40 Ill. 186, 188 (Ill. 1866). 
 272. Phelps v. President & Trs. of Colby Coll., 595 A.2d 403 (Me. 1991). 
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Chi Alpha challenged Colby’s decision in 1984 to ban all fraternities from 
campus; to prohibit the practice of rushing, pledging, and initiating; and to 
expel students for failure to comply.273  They argued that the Maine Civil 
Rights Act barred the private college from restricting the students’ freedom 
of speech and association by banning their fraternity.274  The Supreme 
Judicial Court of Maine declined to decide the difficult question of whether 
the students’ or college’s associational rights took precedence and simply 
held the Act did not reach such disputes.275  Unaddressed was whether a 
private institution could, consistent with antitrust law, really take the severe 
step of eradicating every other institution from the market.276  Of course, 
the residential cases discussed earlier in this Part were not so shy, 
dismissing any fears anent robust competition when universities eliminated 
their rivals in order to secure their own control over students’ lives.277 
And there is little doubt that dominion over students’             
choices—residential and otherwise—is the aim of such fraternity 
interdictions.278  Universities still seem to view themselves as exclusively 
responsible for the care and conduct of their students to the point that alien 
organizations that challenge their control must be quashed or coopted.279  
As the epigram to this Article explained, this perspective is hardly different 
than that of garden-variety monopolists, who desire complete control over 
 
 273. Id. at 403–04. 
 274. Id. at 404.  Almost uniquely, the Maine Civil Rights Act restricts private institutions 
from infringing rights analogous to those found in the Bill of Rights, which is only 
applicable to the government absent such a statute. 
 275. Id. at 407–08.  The question is difficult because enforcing one group’s associational 
rights often conflicts with another party’s: here, the fraternity members sought the right to 
associate with one another, but enforcing that right implicated the university’s right not to 
associate with them.  See generally LAURENCE A. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 
15-17, at 1401–07 (2d ed. 1988). 
 276. See Colby Coll., 595 A.2d at 407–08; Gosk, supra note 8, at 167–68. 
 277. See supra Section II.B. 
 278. See, e.g., Op-Ed., Harvard’s Final Insult, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 17, 2016, 11:20 AM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/harvards-final-insult-1460759189 [https://perma.cc/RUT8-
6W66] (“Campus leftists, who once protested in loco parentis regulations, now aspire to 
total control of student life. They can’t abide the existence of free institutions beyond their 
supervision, much less leaving young people alone to determine for themselves the activities 
that are valuable to their college experience.”); Delta Kappa Epsilon Alumni Corp. v. 
Colgate Univ., 492 F. Supp. 2d 106, 117 (N.D.N.Y. 2007); see also McCauley v. Univ. of 
V.I., 618 F.3d 232, 247 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[U]niversity students, unlike public elementary and 
high school students, often reside in dormitories on campus, so they remain subject to 
university rules at almost all hours of the day.”); Furek v. Univ. of Del., 594 A.2d 506, 516 
(Del. 1991) (“[T]he modern university provides a setting in which every aspect of student 
life is, to some degree, university guided.”). 
 279. See supra Part I. 
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their domains.280  Such accretion of power is clearly not limited to 
traditional businesses: in the seminal NCAA case, the trial court luridly 
condemned a “classic cartel” of colleges exerting “absolute control” over 
its product, which “like all other cartels” demanded artificially high 
payments, imposed characteristic production limits and punished 
noncompliance, fixed prices irrespective of demand, and “like all cartels,” 
parceled out its inflated revenues to its members formulaically.281 
To conclude, as did Hamilton College,282 that the proper market is 
larger than the college town ignores the reality that locked-in collegians are 
in fact not free to transfer universities at will.283  Moreover, contra Yale 
College’s rule,284 it is distinctly unlikely students considered and accepted 
the effects of parietal regulations on their long-term educational experience 
and student debt.285  And regardless of Colgate University’s tortured 
quasi-contractual logic,286 no such consideration can be imputed to students 
and societies who did not sign up for bans on fraternities but had them 
imposed in medias res.287  Some colleges have recognized these realities.288  
Why then are others allowed such domineering control, amounting to 
“nothing less than a frontal assault on the basic policy of the Sherman 
 
 280. See supra text accompanying note 1; see also infra notes 504–05 and 
accompanying text. 
 281. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1300–01 (W.D. 
Okla. 1982), aff’d in part & rev’d in part on other grounds, 707 F. 2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1983), 
aff’d, 468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
 282. See supra notes 139–41, 147–50 and accompanying text. 
 283. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Serv., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 474–77 (1992) 
(discussing the potentially anticompetitive effects of switching costs for locked-in 
consumers). 
 284. See Hack v. President & Fellows of Yale Coll., 237 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2000); see also 
supra notes 181–85, 188–91 and accompanying text. 
 285. See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 474–77 (finding that consumers cannot always 
assess aftermarket costs a priori). 
 286. See supra notes 213–19 and accompanying text. 
 287. See Hack v. President & Fellows of Yale Coll., 237 F.3d 81, 87 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 288. See Timothy M. Burke, The Dartmouth Decision: The End of Another Greek 
System?, FRATERNAL L., Mar. 1999, at 2 (“In an interview with The Dartmouth, President 
Wright appeared to recognize many of the difficulties likely to face the College if it were to 
attempt the total elimination of the Greek system.  Apparently, recognizing that in many 
cases students have made commitments to fraternities and sororities and perhaps with the 
understanding that fraternities and sororities and their house corporations have made 
significant investments based upon the existence of the Greek system at Dartmouth, 
President Wright said ‘we want to work through this and make sure it works well.  We don’t 
want people to have made commitments or participating in organizations with certain 
understandings.  We are not going to suddenly put them out.  We don’t have the authority to 
put them out.  Most of these houses are privately owned.’”). 
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Act[?]”289  The answer is intimated by opinions distinguishing the 
academic world from the commercial, even if antitrust analysis still 
nominally applies.290  The question of what this distinction really is shifts 
the analysis to a new body of law. 
III. LESSONS FOR GREEK-GOWN RELATIONS FROM PARENTAL AND 
PARIETAL RIGHTS 
Various authorities discussed herein refer to a unique relationship 
between a university and its student;291 indeed, some required this sui 
generis status as justification for their holdings.292  This special relationship 
between universities and their students has gone by several names, the most 
common of which are the doctrine of in loco parentis and parietal rights 
already mentioned in the cases.293  The former literally means “in the place 
of the parent,” and hearkens to the idea that the university in its role as 
schoolmaster has been literally invested with the power of its students’ 
 
 289. United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 677 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting FTC v. Ind. 
Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 463 (1986)) (quoted supra note 240). 
 290. See, e.g., Delta Kappa Epsilon Alumni Corp. v. Colgate Univ., 492 F. Supp. 2d 106, 
117 (N.D.N.Y. 2007); see also Brown Univ., 5 F.3d at 670–73 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 291. See supra Section II.B; see also Hauser, supra note 270, at 456–57 (discussing 
excessive regulations on fraternities that amount to constitutional violations); Op-Ed., 
Harvard’s Final Insult, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 17, 2016, 11:20 AM), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/harvards-final-insult-1460759189 [https://perma.cc/RUT8-6W66] (discussing 
Harvard’s purge of political clubs). 
 292. E.g., Colgate Univ., 492 F. Supp. 2d at 117; Hack v. President & Fellows of Yale 
Coll., 237 F.3d 81, 85 (2d. Cir. 2000). 
 293. See, e.g., Philip Lee, The Curious Life of In Loco Parentis at American Universities, 
8 HIGHER EDUC. REVIEW 65 (2011); Nicholas Sweeton & Jeremy Davis, Note, The 
Evolution of In Loco Parentis, 13 J. STUDENT AFF. 67 (2004); Peter F. Lake, The Rise of 
Duty and the Fall of In Loco Parentis and Other Protective Tort Doctrines in Higher 
Education Law, 64 MO. L. REV. 1 (1999); Robert D. Bickel & Peter F. Lake, 
Reconceptualizing the University’s Duty to Provide a Safe Learning Environment: A 
Criticism of the Doctrine of In Loco Parentis and the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 20 J.C. 
& U.L. 261 (1994); Jackson, supra note 24; Theodore C. Stamatakos, Note, The Doctrine of 
In Loco Parentis, Tort Liability, and the Student-College Relationship, 65 IND. L.J. 471 
(1990); James J. Szablewicz & Annette Gibbs, Colleges’ Increasing Exposure to Liability: 
The New In Loco Parentis, 16 J.L. & EDUC. 453 (1987); Gerald A. Fowler, The Legal 
Relationship Between the American College Student and the College: An Historical 
Perspective and the Renewal of a Proposal, 13 J.L. & EDUC. 401 (1984); Richard Cranmer 
Conrath, In Loco Parentis: Recent Developments in This Legal Doctrine as Applied to the 
University-Student Relationship in the United States of America, 1965–75 (June 1976) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Kent State University Graduate School of Education), 
http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED136672.pdf [https://perma.cc/YP3W-EHRY]. 
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parents to control, forbid, and discipline.294  Parietal rights refer to a more 
specific application of the same notion: the right of a university to impose 
regulations for those living within its metaphorical (and literal) walls, 
particularly with regard to enforcing traditionalist mores prohibiting 
intermingling of the sexes.295  Although there is some looseness of 
definition, most authorities consider parietal rights a subset of the more 
general principle of in loco parentis as applied to housing matters.296 
In its general application to college students, the in loco parentis 
doctrine is of ancient origin297 but has been met with powerful opposition 
by the judiciary in the last half century, and most courts now describe it as 
a dead letter in the university context, or at a minimum severely undercut in 
logic and theory.298  In fraternity cases, it has been rejected time and time 
again.299  The particular subset of parietal rights and responsibilities, 
however, still appears to have some staying power.300  Whether this is 
because courts now see residential issues as distinguishable from the 
justifications for rejecting in loco parentis, or whether parietal rights have 
always enjoyed their own independent rationale, modern cases somehow 
 
 294. See Lee, supra note 293, at 66; Stamatakos, supra note 293, at 473–74. 
 295. See Ward, supra note 34; Mandatory Housing Requirements, supra note 2. 
 296. See Delta Kappa Epsilon Alumni Corp. v. Colgate Univ., 492 F. Supp. 2d 106, 117 
(N.D.N.Y. 2007) (quoted supra text accompanying note 221); Fowler, supra note 293, at 48 
(“Even with the return of the World War II veterans, colleges continued to assert the in loco 
parentis role; they administered numerous parietal rules which were often enforced with 
little regard for the privacy or due process rights of students.”); Richard B. Evans, Note, “A 
Stranger in a Strange Land”: Responsibility and Liability for Students Enrolled in Foreign-
Study Programs, 18. J.C. & U.L. 299, 300 (1991) (“Most university administrators 
embraced the in loco parentis doctrine and imposed numerous parietal rules.”); Conrath, 
supra note 293, at 39 (“[Clarence J. Bakken] outlines three basic areas of college life where 
in loco parentis is most applicable: student activities, housing, and student discipline.  
Bakken feels that the parietal rule used in housing is only one aspect of the more basic rule 
that governs the entirety of college life, that is, in loco parentis.  He feels, however, that this 
rule, intended primarily to allow a university to require that unmarried minors live ‘in 
college-approved housing under rules and regulations established for their physical, moral, 
and mental protection,’ should be carefully reevaluated before being applied to adults.” 
(footnote omitted) (quoting Clarence J. Bakken, Legal Aspects of In Loco Parentis, 8 J.C. 
STUDENT PERSONNEL 234, 235 (1967))); Mandatory Housing Requirements, supra note 2, at 
995–97 (discussing parietal rules under in loco parentis rubric). 
 297. See infra Sections III.A.1, III.A.2. 
 298. See infra Section III.A.3. 
 299. See infra Section III.B. 
 300. See infra Section III.C. 
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treat the university’s special relationship in residential life as less 
questionable than in other areas.301 
A. The Decline and Fall of In Loco Parentis 
To understand why in loco parentis has fallen so dramatically from 
favor, it will be necessary to trace its evolution from the earliest legal 
tractates to its emphatic rejection in colleges in the latter half of the 
twentieth century.  As with many bodies of law, the reason for its 
abandonment is substantially due to societal upheavals rather than purely 
jurisprudential reevaluation.302  In the case of in loco parentis, that 
upheaval was the broad and university-focused rejection of traditional 
authority figures during the tumultuous decade of the 1960s.303  Collegians 
forcefully emancipated themselves from the tutelage of the university, 
dispelling the foundation of the in loco parentis doctrine’s application to 
them.304  The passage of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution in 1971 only formalized what the previous decade had amply 
proven: college men and women were to be treated as full-fledged adults.305 
1. Blackstone and the Presumption of Paternalism 
The original formulation of the in loco parentis doctrine dates back to 
William Blackstone, who explained in his Commentaries that a parent 
“may . . . delegate part of his parental authority, during his life, to the tutor 
or schoolmaster of his child; who is then in loco parentis, and has such a 
portion of the power of the parent committed to his charge, viz. that of 
restraint and correction, as may be necessary.”306  Blackstone’s reference to 
“correction” is a euphemism for the original context in which the doctrine 
was asserted: as an affirmative defense by schoolmasters rebutting claims 
of battery lodged by their pupils.307  One early case, for example, concerned 
 
 301. Cf. Mandatory Housing Requirements, supra note 2, at 998–1000 (examining 
whether justifications for parietal rules can be disentangled from their wellspring in the in 
loco parentis doctrine). 
 302. See Sunshine, Lazarus Taxon, supra note 3, at 81, 110–11. 
 303. See infra notes 349–54 and accompanying text. 
 304. See Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135, 139–40 (3d Cir. 1979); Lee, supra note 
293, at 76. 
 305. See Lee, supra note 293, at 69, 76; Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 197 (1972) 
(Douglas, J., concurring); Bradshaw, 612 F.2d at 140. 
 306. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655 (1995) (quoting 1 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *441). 
 307. See Jackson, supra note 24, at 1144. 
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a student’s being whipped for referring to his instructor disrespectfully.308  
These original conceptions of in loco parentis were limited to primary and 
secondary schools, where the pupils were legal minors and thus the 
parental power conveyed to the schoolmaster was absolute.309  Given the 
dependability that such students were minors, the doctrine conceptually 
became more anchored to the relationship of tutor to tutee as justification 
even when a peculiar student happened to exceed the age of majority.310 
As adopted and applied in America in the nineteenth century, the 
doctrine of in loco parentis came to afford nigh boundless authority on 
schools to regulate and discipline their students, subject only to limitations 
on the most extreme forms of corporal punishment: batteries done with 
malice, causing permanent injury, or that are clearly excessive.311  Any 
other rule or conduct was within the school’s prerogative; or as Justice 
Clarence Thomas has summarized: “The doctrine of in loco parentis 
limited the ability of schools to set rules and control their classrooms in 
almost no way.”312  Although such power is fundamentally despotic, its 
scope was widely accepted313 and rooted in the notion that primary 
education served the vital end of instilling civic virtue and moral probity; 
the teacher 
must govern these pupils, quicken the slothful, spur the indolent, restrain 
the impetuous, and control the stubborn.  He must make rules, give 
commands, and punish disobedience.  What rules, what commands, and 
what punishments shall be imposed, are necessarily largely within the 
discretion of the master.314 
Given the students’ status as children, moreover, such absolute 
authority is not completely surprising.  The law, after all, still recognizes 
the entitlement of parents today to arbitrarily employ corporal punishment 
and otherwise exert control over their children315—actions that would be 
 
 308. Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114, 115 (1859); see also Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 
393, 414–15 (2007)  (Thomas, J., concurring) (discussing Lander). 
 309. See Morse, 551 U.S. at 413. 
 310. E.g., Morse, 551 U.S. at 413 n.3 (“My discussion is limited to elementary and 
secondary education.  In these settings, courts have applied the doctrine of in loco parentis 
regardless of the student’s age.  Therefore, the fact that Frederick was 18 and not a minor 
under Alaska law is inconsequential.” (citations omitted)). 
 311. Id. at 416.; see Dean v. State, 8 So. 38, 39 (Ala. 1890). 
 312. Morse, 551 U.S. at 416. 
 313. Id. at 414 n.4. 
 314. Patterson v. Nutter, 7 A. 273, 274 (Me. 1886) (quoted in Morse, 551 U.S. at 414). 
 315. E.g., In re Welfare of the Children of N.F. & S.F., 749 N.W.2d 802, 810 (Minn. 
2008) (“We are unwilling to establish a bright-line rule that the infliction of any pain 
constitutes either physical injury or physical abuse, because to do so would effectively 
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wholly repugnant to the Constitution and statute were they taken against a 
competent adult.316  Yet there was a further justification: the judiciary’s 
desire to avoid meddling with the internal function and disciplinary 
procedures of the school to whose governance the student was submitted.317  
This latter rationale would prove to be the medium by which in loco 
parentis successfully transposed itself to tertiary education at colleges and 
universities. 
2. Paternalism in Institutes of Higher Education 
The extension of in loco parentis from children enrolled in primary 
school to university students might appear a substantial leap to modern 
eyes.  But one must recall that for much of American history, students in 
universities were not yet considered adults and were usually legal 
minors.318  The academic career’s progression to institutions of higher 
education was far less ossified, and students often matriculated at colleges 
well before the age of eighteen.319  Tutors and professors were 
disciplinarian overseers of a strictly defined code of conduct and uniform 
syllabus that mirrored children’s academies: Greek and Latin classics, 
religious lessons, and history.320  In short, the universities of yore were 
much closer continuations of the milieu of secondary schools. 
The first cases tentatively equating schoolmasters and schoolchildren 
with deans and undergraduates arose in the latter half of the 1800s.321  It is 
generally agreed,322 however, that the leading judicial acceptance of in loco 
 
prohibit all corporal punishment of children by their parents. . . .  [I]t is clear to us that the 
legislature did not intend to ban corporal punishment.”). 
 316. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339 (1985) (“[A] proper educational 
environment requires close supervision of schoolchildren, as well as the enforcement of 
rules against conduct that would be perfectly permissible if undertaken by an adult.”); 
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654 (1995) (discussing and reaffirming 
T.L.O.); see also Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683–85 (1986) (permitting 
school to forbid lewd speech because of the minority of the audience). 
 317. Morse, 551 U.S. at 414 (discussing Sheehan v. Sturges, 2 A. 841, 842 (1885)). 
 318. See SYRETT, supra note 20, at 15 (“These students were often quite young, many 
entering [college] as young as ten years old and most graduating well before their twentieth 
birthdays.”). 
 319. See id. 
 320. See id. at 16–20; Jackson, supra note 24, at 1139–40; Fowler, supra note 293, at 
405. 
 321. See, e.g., People ex rel. Pratt v. Wheaton Coll., 40 Ill. 186 (Ill. 1866) (cited in 
Jackson, supra note 24, at 1146 n.85 and Lee, supra note 293, at 68–69); North v. Bd. of 
Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 27 N.E. 54 (Ill. 1891) (quoted in Lee, supra note 293, at 69). 
 322. E.g., Lee, supra note 293, at 69; Stamatakos, supra note 293, at 473–74; Jackson, 
supra note 24, at 1146; Szablewicz & Gibbs, supra note 293, at 454. 
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parentis for universities arrived in Gott v. Berea College, a 1913 decision 
of the Kentucky Supreme Court.323  There, an aggrieved restaurateur 
brought suit against the academy that had forbidden its students from 
patronizing his establishment.324  The court was unmoved and took the side 
of the college: 
  College authorities stand in loco parentis concerning the physical and 
moral welfare and mental training of the pupils, and we are unable to see 
why, to that end, they may not make any rule or regulation for the 
government or betterment of their pupils that a parent could for the same 
purpose. Whether the rules or regulations are wise or their aims worthy is a 
matter left solely to the discretion of the authorities or parents as the case 
may be, and, in the exercise of that discretion, the courts are not disposed to 
interfere, unless the rules and aims are unlawful or against public policy.325 
Berea College signaled that the ambit afforded to colleges would be as 
broad as primary schools.326  All the same—and perhaps by necessity—the 
emphasis in the context of higher education shifted to the privity of the 
relationship between college and student, rather than the necessity of 
corporal discipline to the education of youngsters—the concern that 
animated the proliferation of in loco parentis in the primary school 
posture.327 
Other cases followed apace: courts around the nation were agreeing en 
masse that university authorities enjoyed little to no restraint on their 
discretion.328  In 1924, for example, the Florida Supreme Court adopted 
virtually the same formulation as Berea College, quoting it with 
approval.329  This was particularly true in gendered matters: in the same 
year, the Maryland Supreme Court declared it would defer completely to 
 
 323. Gott v. Berea Coll., 161 S.W. 204 (Ky. 1913). 
 324. Id. at 205. 
 325. Id. at 206. 
 326. Id.; see also Jackson, supra note 24, at 1146–47. 
 327. E.g., Berea Coll., 161 S.W. at 205–06; John B. Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 102 So. 637, 
640–41 (Fla. 1924); see Fowler, supra note 293, at 413–14. 
 328. See, e.g., Woods v. Simpson, 126 A. 882 (Md. 1924); Barker v. Trs. of Bryn Mawr 
Coll., 122 A. 220 (Pa. 1923); Booker v. Grand Rapids Med. Coll., 120 N.W. 589 (Mich. 
1909); see also Jackson, supra note 24, at 47 n.95; see also supra notes 311–14 and 
accompanying text. 
 329. Stetson Univ., 102 So. at 640 (“As to mental training, moral and physical discipline, 
and welfare of the pupils, college authorities stand in loco parentis and in their discretion 
may make any regulation for their government which a parent could make for the same 
purpose, and so long as such regulations do not violate divine or human law, courts have no 
more authority to interfere than they have to control the domestic discipline of a father in his 
family.” (citing Gott v. Berea Coll., 101 S.W. 204 (Ky. 1913) (quoted in Lee, supra note 
293, at 70)). 
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faculties in matters of discipline and discretion, “especially in dealing with 
girl students.”330  And in perhaps the most absurd example, the plaintiff in 
1928’s Anthony v. Syracuse University found no recourse in the courts for 
the stated cause for expulsion of not being “a typical Syracuse girl.”331  In 
the Maryland case, the opprobrious behavior was the plaintiffs’ alleged 
involvement in an accusation published in the school newspaper “that men 
officials of the University were making objectionable suggestions to girl 
students and otherwise exhibiting a wrong moral attitude toward them,” 
foreshadowing the more specific set of parietal rights that colleges claimed 
over relations between enrolled men and women.332 
The relationship as fully realized inured to the mutual benefit of both 
student and school: it “imposed a duty on the college to exercise control 
over student conduct and, reciprocally, gave the students certain rights of 
protection by the college.”333  Just as the inherent result of parents’ duty to 
control a child is that parents may be liable for shirking their duty, so too 
the doctrine of in loco parentis implied that universities could be held 
responsible when their regulations failed to protect the charges whom they 
had a duty to protect.334  For example, in Brigham Young University v. 
 
 330. Woods, 126 A. at 883. 
 331. Anthony v. Syracuse Univ., 231 N.Y.S. 435, 437 (N.Y. App. Div. 1928). 
 332. Woods, 126 A. at 882. 
 333. Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135, 139 (3d Cir. 1979); accord Baldwin v. 
Zoradi, 176 Cal. Rptr. 809, 816–17 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981); Univ. of Denver v. Whitlock, 744 
P.2d 54, 59–60 (Colo. 1987) (en banc); Rabel v. Ill. Wesleyan Univ., 514 N.E.2d 552,   
559–60 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987); Stamatakos, supra note 293, at 474 (“This latter notion of 
physical welfare is critical to institutional tort liability: The exercise of legal authority is 
inextricably bound with the obligations of legal duty, and Gott suggests that the in loco 
parentis doctrine imposes a duty to protect the physical welfare of students.  Thus, as 
college administrators governed students with parental authority, courts began to recognize 
a correlative legal duty to protect the students over which such authority was exercised.”).  
Contra Lake, supra note 293, at 6 (calling the reciprocal view of in loco parentis as 
imposing both duties and immunities “misguided and doctrinally incoherent”); Bickel & 
Lake, supra note 293, at 271–73 (rejecting reciprocal view); see also Stamatakos, supra 
note 293, at 482–84 (distinguishing theories underlying ostensible in loco parentis cases 
finding collegiate liability). 
 334. See Edward J. Schoen & Joseph S. Falchek, You Haze, I Sue: A Fraternity Stew, 18 
J. LEGAL STUD. EDUC. 127, 128 n.3 (2000) (describing in loco parentis as when “colleges 
and universities were deemed to have a duty to protect the safety and welfare of their 
students, as parents are expected to protect their children.”); Angela N. Marshlain, 
Non-Hazing Injuries to Fraternity and Sorority Members: Should the Fraternal Association 
be Required to Assume a Parental Role?, 5 APPALACHIAN L.J. 1, 13 (2006) (“When the 
doctrine of in loco parentis was applied to universities, college administrators and 
professors were required to assume a parental role thereby establishing a parent-child 
relationship between the university and the students. This non-traditional parent-child 
relationship gave rise to a legally recognized duty which when breached, amounted in 
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Lillywhite,335 and in Hamburger v. Cornell University,336 the university was 
held liable to students injured by chemical accidents upon a finding of 
negligence in its duties, as exercised by its faculty.337  Although liability 
arose from traditional analysis in tort, the underlying relationship giving 
rise to the duty was ipso facto that of a student with a custodial 
university.338 
3. The End of Traditional In Loco Parentis at Universities 
With startling uniformity, authorities cite the single case Dixon v. 
Alabama State Board of Education339 as “sounding the ‘death knell’” for 
the doctrine of in loco parentis in 1961.340  To be sure, it was a case 
involving obnoxious facts that cried out for judicial intervention: six black 
students at Alabama State College had been summarily expelled for 
participating in a civil rights demonstration.341  The court of appeals rightly 
took umbrage, noting that the school was an arm of the state government, 
and as such “due process requires notice and some opportunity for hearing 
before a student at a tax-supported college is expelled for misconduct,” 
including the right to notice of the charges, to a hearing, to present 
witnesses on his behalf, and to be heard by the highest governing authority 
of the school.342  Such detailed limitations on a college’s right of internal 
discipline repudiated in loco parentis starkly, although sub silentio: the 
opinion made no mention of the doctrine.  Many more opinions followed 
Dixon throughout the 1960s, resting on similar premises that state schools 
 
imposing liability upon the university.” (footnotes omitted)); Szablewicz & Gibbs, supra 
note 293, at 454; Bradshaw, 612 F.2d at 139; Stamatakos, supra note 293, at 474. 
 335. Brigham Young Univ. v. Lillywhite, 118 F.2d 836 (10th Cir. 1941). 
 336. Hamburger v. Cornell Univ., 172 N.Y.S. 5 (N.Y. App. Div. 1918). 
 337. See also Barr. v. Brooklyn Children’s Aid Soc., 190 N.Y.S. 296, 297 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1921) (“If it could be said under this complaint that the defendant is a college or university, 
the defendant would be liable. This is clearly now the law.” (citing Hamburger, 172 N.Y.S. 
5)).  See Stamatakos, supra note 293, at 474, 474 n.17 (citing Brigham Young Univ., 118 
F.2d 836, and Barr, 190 N.Y.S. 296, in the context of in loco parentis); Szablewicz & 
Gibbs, supra note 293, at 455 (citing Brigham Young Univ. and Barr in the context of in 
loco parentis). 
 338. See Szablewicz & Gibbs, supra note 293, at 455; supra note 333 and accompanying 
text. 
 339. Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 
930 (1961). 
 340. Fowler, supra note 293, at 408.  See id. at 408 n.42; accord, e.g., Lake, supra note 
293, at 9; Jackson, supra note 24, at 1149; Lee, supra note 293, at 70–71. 
 341. Dixon, 294 F.2d at 151–53. 
 342. Id. at 158. 
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were not free to violate constitutional rights under the guise of internal 
regulations.343 
Dixon studiously limited its holding to public institutions of higher 
education, declaring that relations between private schools and their 
students were a matter of contract rather than due process.344  Such a model 
dated back to the early decisions in which the private school’s code of 
conduct and regulations were interpreted in a quasi-contractual fashion.345  
Some initial decisions in the 1960s hewed to that line: St. John’s University 
was allowed to expel students violating its Roman Catholic marital rules,346 
and Columbia University was permitted to discipline students involved in 
trespassory protests in the name of civil disobedience, which is the very 
sort of the behavior Dixon had condemned.347  (In fairness, the relationship 
between a university and its students is generally viewed as contractual to 
this day.348) 
That distinction between public and private did not long outlast the 
1960s, however.349  In 1971, the Twenty-Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution lowered the age of majority to eighteen, granting 
university students the franchise en masse.350  The next year, Justice 
William O. Douglas wrote that “[s]tudents—who, by reason of the 
Twenty-sixth Amendment, become eligible to vote when 18 years of age—
 
 343. E.g., Marzette v. McPhee, 294 F. Supp. 562 (W.D. Wisc. 1968) (due process); 
Dickey v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 273 F. Supp. 613 (M.D. Ala. 1967) (First Amendment); 
Hammond v. S.C. State Coll., 272 F. Supp. 947 (D.S.C. 1967) (First Amendment); Knight 
v. State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn. 1961) (due process). 
 344. Dixon, 294 F.2d at 157; see Lake, supra note 293, at 10; Jackson, supra note 24, at 
1153–54. 
 345. See, e.g., Fowler, supra note 293, at 411–13; see also Delta Kappa Epsilon Alumni 
Corp. v. Colgate Univ., 492 F. Supp. 2d 106, 116 (N.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 346. Carr v. St. John’s Univ., 187 N.E.2d 18 (N.Y. 1962). 
 347. Grossner v. Tr. of Columbia Univ., 287 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). 
 348. See, e.g., Yu v. Vassar Coll., 97 F. Supp. 3d 448, 481 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (“In New 
York, the relationship between a university and its students is contractual in nature.” 
(quoting Papaspiridakos v. Educ. Affiliates, Inc., No. 10 CV 5628(RJD)(JO), 2013 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 129748, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 2013), aff’d, 580 F. App’x 17 (2d Cir. 
2014))); Vought v. Teachers Coll., Columbia Univ., 511 N.Y.S.2d 880, 881 (App. Div. 
1987) (“When a student is admitted to a university, an implied contract arises between the 
parties which states that if the student complies with the terms prescribed by the university, 
he will obtain the degree he seeks.” (citing Carr v. St. John’s Univ., 231 N.Y.S.2d 410, 413 
(App. Div.), aff’d, 12 N.Y.2d 802 (1962))). 
 349. See Lake, supra note 293, at 10 (“Following the spirit of the decisions regarding 
public universities, courts began to decide that private colleges also owed their students 
fundamental fairness. The courts achieved this through rules of contract interpretation and 
read ‘the contract’ liberally in favor of student rights. . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
 350. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI; see Lee, supra note 293, at 76. 
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are adults who are members of the college or university community.”351  
Following this lead, in Bradshaw v. Rawlings,352 the Third Circuit  
absolved the university of liability where a student injured in a drunken 
driving accident claimed the university had been negligent in its duty to 
protect its students in loco parentis.353  In so holding, the court expansively 
rejected any notion that the college had responsibility for the conduct and 
safety of its adult students: 
As a result of these and other similar developments in our society, eighteen 
year old students are now identified with an expansive bundle of individual 
and social interests and possess discrete rights not held by college students 
from decades past. There was a time when college administrators and 
faculties assumed a role in loco parentis. Students were committed to their 
charge because the students were considered minors. A special relationship 
was created between college and student that imposed a duty on the college 
to exercise control over student conduct and, reciprocally, gave the students 
certain rights of protection by the college. The campus revolutions of the 
late sixties and early seventies were a direct attack by the students on rigid 
controls by the colleges and were an all-pervasive affirmative demand for 
more student rights.  In general, the students succeeded, peaceably and 
otherwise, in acquiring a new status at colleges throughout the country. 
These movements, taking place almost simultaneously with legislation and 
case law lowering the age of majority, produced fundamental changes in 
our society. A dramatic reapportionment of responsibilities and social 
interests of general security took place. Regulation by the college of student 
life on and off campus has become limited. Adult students now demand 
and receive expanded rights of privacy in their college life including, for 
example, liberal, if not unlimited, par[iet]al visiting hours.354  College 
administrators no longer control the broad arena of general morals. At one 
time, exercising their rights and duties in loco parentis, colleges were able 
to impose strict regulations. But today students vigorously claim the right 
to define and regulate their own lives. Especially have they demanded and 
received satisfaction of their interest in self-assertion in both physical and 
mental activities, and have vindicated what may be called the interest in 
freedom of the individual will.355 
As the nation entered the 1980s, colleges were no longer accountable 
for the welfare of their students under in loco parentis: they could not 
 
 351. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 197 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 352. Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135 (3d Cir. 1979). 
 353. Id. at 144. 
 354. The official reporter mistranscribed the esoteric term “parietal” as “partial.”  
Subsequent opinions have recognized and corrected this scrivener’s error.  E.g., Nero v. 
Kan. State Univ., 861 P.2d 768, 773–74 (Kan. 1993). 
 355. Bradshaw, 612 F.2d at 139–40 (footnotes omitted). 
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assert all-encompassing parental authority over them, but neither were they 
strictly accountable for protecting them from one another.356  To be sure, 
there were still situations where colleges were held responsible, but these 
were at least purportedly in spite of in loco parentis rather than because of 
it.357 
Justice Samuel Alito recently criticized in loco parentis in the context 
of public education: 
When public school authorities regulate student speech, they act as agents 
of the State; they do not stand in the shoes of the students’ parents. It is a 
dangerous fiction to pretend that parents simply delegate their authority—
including their authority to determine what their children may say and 
hear—to public school authorities.  It is even more dangerous to assume 
that such a delegation of authority somehow strips public school authorities 
of their status as agents of the State.  Most parents, realistically, have no 
choice but to send their children to a public school and little ability to in-
fluence what occurs in the school.  It is therefore wrong to treat public 
school officials, for purposes relevant to the First Amendment, as if they 
were private, nongovernmental actors standing in loco parentis.358 
Such arguments are not strictly apposite to non-compulsory 
institutions such as private schools and tertiary education, but Justice 
Alito’s rebuke highlights the speciousness of the legal fiction of parental 
delegation.359  Even in private schools, parents hardly exercise control over 
 
 356. See Freeman v. Busch, 349 F.3d 582, 587 (8th Cir. 2003) (“[S]ince the late 1970s, 
the general rule is that no special relationship exists between a college and its own students 
because a college is not an insurer of the safety of its students.”); Lee, supra note 293, at 76 
(“By the early 1970s, in loco parentis at universities was a relic of the past.”); Lake, supra 
note 293, at 9–10; Stamatakos, supra note 293, at 474–76; e.g., Rabel v. Ill. Wesleyan 
Univ., 514 N.E.2d 552, 560–61 (Ill. App. 1987) (“The university’s responsibility to its 
students, as an institution of higher education, is to properly educate them. It would be 
unrealistic to impose upon a university the additional role of custodian over its adult 
students and to charge it with the responsibility for assuring their safety and the safety of 
others.”); Eisman v. State, 511 N.E.2d 1128, 1136 (N.Y. 1987); Beach v. Univ. of Utah, 726 
P.2d 413, 419 (Utah 1986) (“Fulfilling this charge would require the institution to babysit 
each student, a task beyond the resources of any school. But more importantly, such 
measures would be inconsistent with the nature of the relationship between the student and 
the institution, for it would produce a repressive and inhospitable environment, largely 
inconsistent with the objectives of a modern college education.”). 
 357. See infra Section III.C; Stamatakos, supra note 293, at 485–86 (discussing cases 
cited in Tia Miyamoto, Liability of Colleges and Universities for Injuries During 
Extracurricular Activities, 15 J.C. & U.L. 149 (1988)). 
 358. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 424 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring). 
 359. See, e.g., Ralph D. Mawdsley, Random Drug Testing for Extracurricular Activities: 
Has the Supreme Court Opened Pandora’s Box for Public Schools?, 2003 B.Y.U. EDUC. & 
L.J. 587, 604  (“In loco parentis can be a convenient legal fiction for public schools, but 
school officials may find that they have exceeded the limits of that fiction by implementing 
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the curricula or parietal rules, and the notion that they are designating the 
college as their legal proxy would surprise most if not all parents.360  
Whatever force in loco parentis had in a more parochial era of education, it 
should have little relevance now.361  Indeed, the Third Circuit lately 
revisited its ruling in Bradshaw and emphatically reaffirmed the death of in 
loco parentis.362 
B. Paternalism Meets Fraternalism: In Loco Parentis and Greeks 
Thus far the discussion has focused on the relationship of the 
university and the student body as a whole.  Moving from the general to the 
specific, what then of the student who is also a fraternity member?  If the 
university was once thought to exercise quasi-parental supervision over its 
charges, might not the same be said of the fraternity over its initiates or the 
university over the fraternity?  In short, perhaps the fraternal structure lends 
particular strength to the arguments for applying a special relationship 
between the student and the institutions—fraternal and academic alike—of 
which he is a member. 
1. Arguments for a Particular Focus on Greek Society 
After all, since their original days, many of the benefits ascribed to 
fraternal living focused on the moderating force that upperclassmen exert 
 
a policy that some parents neither favor nor would authorize for application to their 
children.” (footnote omitted)). 
 360. See, e.g., id.  Several scholars have discussed the demise of in loco parentis.  See 
Lee, supra note 293, at 72–76; Lake, supra note 293, at 9–10; Stamatakos, supra note 293, 
at 474–76.  But see Sweeton & Davis, supra 293, at 69–72, 71 (“In conclusion, it is clear 
that in loco parentis is not a relic of the past, but rather a powerful force in the present. The 
research conducted by Howe and Strauss (2003) illustrates that parents of today’s 
traditionally-aged college student view themselves as equal partners in the education of their 
children.”); Ward, supra note 34, at 225–26, 225 (“Too, parents often desire to have their 
sons and daughters supervised by residence hall advisors and counselors. Evidence exists 
that many parents think that the college is obligated to enforce the in loco parentis doctrine 
vigorously.”). 
 361. See Lee, supra note 293, at 72–76; Lake, supra note 293, at 9–10; Stamatakos, 
supra note 293, at 474–76.  Contra Sweeton & Davis, supra 293 (arguing for continued 
philosophical validity of the doctrine). 
 362. McCauley v. Univ. of V.I., 618 F.3d 232, 244–45 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Over thirty years 
ago, in Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135 (3d Cir. 1979), we recognized that ‘[w]hatever 
may have been its responsibility in an earlier era, the authoritarian role of today’s college 
administrations has been notably diluted.’ . . . The idea that public universities exercise strict 
control over students via an in loco parentis relationship has decayed to the point of 
irrelevance.” (alteration in original) (quoting Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135, 138 (3d 
Cir. 1979))) 
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on unruly freshmen, acting very much in loco parentis: indeed, the 
fraternity model was often described as a proxy family unit in early 
literature.363  One apologia for Greek life declared forcefully in 1922: 
A seventh ground on which fraternities may be explained and defended is 
that they are, in most colleges, the sole substitute for the home and for 
parental influence and restraint. In too many of our large universities 
contact with professors is an exceedingly remote and impersonal thing. The 
healthy, normal restraint of the ordinarily good home and of adult society is 
wholly lacking. The fraternity supplies this lack as no other association in 
college life is able to do. The fraternity house is the home; in the brothers 
there assembled can be found the substitute for the family; and in the 
upperclassmen, exercising their salutary restraint upon the underclassmen, 
can be found the substitute for parental direction and counsel. This one 
feature of the system justifies the system as it is now practiced.364 
The very terminology of a fraternity or sorority, speaking of brothers 
and sisters, reinforces the view that the society is something of a family 
unit.365  Some courts have observed that brotherhood or sisterhood 
bespeaks complete egalitarianism rather than hierarchy: the mutuality of 
siblings rather than the authority of parent over child.366  Yet this is not 
necessarily so; the ubiquitous fraternal practice of assigning new members 
big brothers or big sisters, as the case may be, dispels any notion that 
siblings are insusceptible of hierarchy.367  To maul the good work of 
George Orwell, all fraternity members may be equal, but some members 
 
 363. E.g., HOWARD BEMENT & DOUGLAS BEMENT, THE STORY OF ZETA PSI 102–03 (2d 
ed. 1932). 
 364. BEMENT & BEMENT, supra note 363, at 11 (emphasis added). 
 365. E.g., Chi Iota Colony of Alpha Epsilon Pi Frat. v. City Univ. of N.Y., 443 F. Supp. 
2d 374, 377 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (“Plaintiffs explain that ‘[t]he single-sex, all male nature of the 
Fraternity is essential to achieving and maintaining the congeniality, cohesion and stability 
that enable it to function as a surrogate family and to meet social, emotional and cultural 
needs of its members.’” (quoting the fraternity’s constitution)), rev’d, 502 F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 
2007). 
 366. Alumni Ass’n v. Sullivan, 572 A.2d 1209, 1213 (Pa. 1990) (“By definition such 
organizations are based upon fraternal, not paternal, relationships. . . . Fraternal 
organizations are premised upon a fellowship of equals; it is not a relationship where one 
group is superior to the other and may be held responsible for the conduct of the other.”). 
 367. See, e.g., Garofalo v. Lambda Chi Alpha Fraternity, 616 N.W.2d 647, 650 (Iowa 
2000) (describing death occurring in connection with “a Big Brother/Little Brother 
ceremony at the fraternity house”); see also Shaheen v. Yonts, 394 F. App’x 224, 229 (6th 
Cir. 2010) (discussing Garofalo). 
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are more equal than others.368  These senior members naturally gravitate 
towards more authoritarian and thus parental roles.369 
Lest such orotund conceits be thought restricted to historic authors, a 
social scientist recently framed an entire anthropological study around the 
metaphor of fraternity as a family of sorts.  In The Lost Boys of Zeta Psi, 
Professor Laurie Wilkie of the University of California at Berkeley tells the 
story of a local chapter through the lens of the lost boys of J.M. Barrie’s 
Peter Pan, unmoored from parental influences and subject only to their 
own supervision.370  Such a conception reinforces the treatises that saw 
elder members of the fraternity as the only sources of civilizing influence 
on the younger, taking the place of absent parents.371  Under this view, the 
fraternity must act in loco parentis almost by default, filling a void of 
necessity. 
Some authors have analogously felt that the unruly or sequestered 
nature of fraternities necessitates particular supervision by the university.  
Often these sentiments respond to the problem of fraternities’ hazing new 
members, leading some colleges to “regulate them beyond recognition” in 
an effort to curb such abuses.372  Indeed, university control is generally 
greatest in the punctilious rules and restrictions imposed on fraternities’ 
recruitment and induction efforts.373 Similarly, modern colleges often 
provide social engagement as well as an education, and they may feel it 
incumbent to attempt to lessen raucous Animal-House-like carousing in an 
effort to avoid injury to their students or liability.374  And, of course, courts 
have long been deferential to collegiate judgments that fraternities may be 
banned entirely to maintain academic focus and discipline and that students 
violating such bans may be excluded from the college.375 
 
 368. GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM 112 (1946) (“All animals are equal, but some 
animals are more equal than others.”). 
 369. BEMENT & BEMENT, supra note 363, at 11. 
 370. See generally WILKIE, supra note 35. 
 371. See id. at 23–26, 266–68. 
 372. Govan, supra note 7, at 698–99; see Hauser, supra note 270, at 435–37. 
 373. See Hauser, supra note 270, at 435–36; Sunshine, Fraternity as Franchise, supra 
note 3, at 424–25 nn.325–27. 
 374. See, e.g., Kerri Mumford, Comment, Who Is Responsible for Fraternity Related 
Injuries on American College Campuses?, 17 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 737, 737–38 
(2001). 
 375. People ex rel. Pratt v. Wheaton Coll., 40 Ill. 186 (Ill. 1866) (expulsion of student for 
joining secret society); see cases discussed supra Section II.C.2. 
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2. Judicial Rejection of In Loco Parentis Duties Anent Fraternities 
Notwithstanding the noble conceit of the fraternity as foster family, 
the law has not embraced this formally.  Neither, by judicial lights, is the 
modern fraternity member uniquely subject to parenting by the university 
by virtue of his membership, despite the arguments for such heightened 
scrutiny.  As in the more generalized case, the Twenty-Sixth Amendment 
was generally seen as codifying a rejection of such in loco parentis 
responsibility over college fraternity members.376  The common result is 
that chapters and campuses alike escape purely vicarious liability for 
injuries done to or by fraternity members in the mine run of factual 
postures, even whilst losing their expansive onetime rights to regulate with 
untrammeled authority.377 
In one of the first such cases, the Indiana Court of Appeals rejected 
arguments that the private Wabash University and fraternity should be 
responsible for injuries caused by a drunken driving accident involving a 
fraternity member, finding for the institutional defendants as a matter of 
law.378  Citing Bradshaw with favor, the court held that “students and 
fraternity members are not children.  Save for very few legal exceptions, 
they are adult citizens, ready, able, and willing to be responsible for their 
own actions.  Colleges and fraternities are not expected to assume a role 
anything akin to in loco parentis or a general insurer.”379  Prudently, the 
court did allow that there might arise a factual matrix in which a fraternity 
 
 376. See Timothy M. Burke, Fraternities and the Right to Privacy, FRATERNAL L., Sept. 
1983, at 5 (“As recently as the late 1960s, colleges and universities were often said to stand 
in loco parentis to their students. That is, the university administration took the place of the 
student’s parents while the students were on the campus. Fraternities and their governing 
bodies were often cast in the same light. . . .  While the age of majority is not uniform and 
often differs for the purpose of purchase or consumption of alcoholic beverages, college 
students today should generally be viewed as adults, with both the rights and responsibilities 
consistent with that status.”); Schoen & Falchek, supra note 334, at 128 n.3; see also 
Marshlain, supra note 334, at 15–16 (noting reasons for abolishing in loco parentis apply 
with equal effect to fraternities as universities). 
 377. Mumford, supra note 374, at 738 (“Until now, universities have successfully 
avoided liability for fraternity-related injuries based on the ‘no duty’ rule, following the 
demise of in loco parentis doctrine for universities.  The ‘no duty’ rule states that the 
relationship between the college and the student is simply one that provides education only. 
The university is under no obligation or duty to control or govern the students’ behavior. . . .  
Courts continually rely on this analysis of the relationship and the concern that holding the 
college liable will return it to the strict liability standard of in loco parentis as a basis for 
finding no liability.”). 
 378. Campbell v. Bd. of Trs. of Wabash Coll., 495 N.E.2d 227, 232–33 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1986). 
 379. Id. at 232. 
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could be held responsible under a general supervisory duty but that the 
defunct in loco parentis doctrine would not suffice.380 
The Colorado Supreme Court followed suit the next year in University 
of Denver v. Whitlock,381 where a fraternity member sued the university for 
a paralyzing injury suffered whilst using a trampoline on the Beta Theta Pi 
fraternity’s premises, which was leased from the university.382  The trial 
court directed a verdict for the university, but a divided panel reversed on 
appeal, holding that the university had a duty to supervise the fraternity and 
remove the dangerous plaything.383  Sitting en banc, the Colorado Supreme 
Court reinstated the directed verdict,384 citing Bradshaw extensively, and 
recognizing that although in loco parentis might once have been good law, 
“in modern times there has evolved a gradual reapportionment of 
responsibilities from the universities to the students, and a corresponding 
departure from the in loco parentis relationship.  Today, colleges and 
universities are regarded as educational institutions rather than custodial 
ones.”385  Tellingly, the court found that “fraternity and sorority 
self-governance with minimal supervision appears to have been fostered by 
the University.”386  Accordingly, there was no basis for in loco parentis 
simply because the injury occurred in a fraternity context.387 
Two early 1990s cases from Pennsylvania—one state and one 
federal—serve as additional examples of the overwhelming trend.388  In the 
state case, a student who was served alcohol at both a college dormitory 
and fraternity party impleaded the university and fraternity when he was 
sued for property damage caused by a fire later in the evening.389  The court 
was unimpressed with the third-party defendants’ attenuated connection to 
the fire and dismissed the impleader, commenting that the plaintiff “would 
have us impose upon appellees a custodial relationship with University 
students.  Clearly, in modern times, it would be inappropriate to impose an 
 
 380. Id. 
 381. Univ. of Denver v. Whitlock, 744 P.2d 54 (Colo. 1987) (en banc); see also 
Szablewicz & Gibbs, supra note 293, at 459–61 (tracing the lower court development). 
 382. Whitlock, 744 P.2d at 55–56. 
 383. Id. at 56; see Whitlock v. Univ. of Denver, 712 P.2d 1072 (Colo. App. 1985). 
 384. Whitlock, 744 P.2d at 62. 
 385. Id. at 59–60 (citation omitted). 
 386. Id. at 60. 
 387. Id. at 60–61. 
 388. Alumni Ass’n v. Sullivan, 572 A.2d 1209, 1213 (Pa. 1990); Booker v. Lehigh 
Univ., 800 F. Supp. 234 (E.D. Pa. 1992); see Timothy M. Burke, Drawing the Line on 
Liability, FRATERNAL L., Sept. 1990, at 3 (discussing Sullivan). 
 389. Sullivan, 572 A.2d at 1209–10. 
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in loco parentis duty upon a university.”390  As in the previous cases, the 
court laded praise on the “instructive” observations of the Bradshaw 
ruling.391 
The federal case concerned a sorority member claiming injury after 
becoming intoxicated at multiple fraternity parties.392  The plaintiff 
presented the novel argument that Lehigh University had contractually 
taken on the powers of in loco parentis via a binding social policy 
statement on alcohol and therefore assumed the responsibility for 
monitoring fraternities and protecting the plaintiff from harm.393  The court 
concluded that 
even if Lehigh knowingly failed to prevent alcohol consumption, we could 
not, nor would we, find a duty in loco parentis. If we were to hold that the 
Social Policy created a duty to prevent Lehigh students from engaging in 
underage drinking, we would be finding that Lehigh was potentially liable 
in loco parentis, despite clear decisions from the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court that such cannot form the basis for imposing liability upon a 
college.394 
Yet again, Bradshaw was deemed “instructive” and quoted at 
length.395  It is fair to say that Bradshaw has proven highly persuasive in 
the Greek context;396 other courts are in accord, often including encomia to 
Bradshaw as well as agreeing in the result.397  Commentators too widely 
agree that in loco parentis is dead in cases involving fraternities.398  College 
students, including fraternity members, have made a conscious trade: they 
have reclaimed control of their lives from the pervasive control of the 
university, but with that freedom comes legal responsibility for the 
consequences of their own actions.399 
 
 390. Id. at 1213. 
 391. Id. 
 392. Booker, 800 F. Supp. at 235–36. 
 393. Id. at 236–37. 
 394. Id. at 240 (footnote omitted). 
 395. Id. at 238. 
 396. See, e.g., Marshlain, supra note 334, at 7–9 (describing relationship of Bradshaw to 
fraternity cases). 
 397. E.g., Millard v. Osborne, 611 A.2d 715 (Pa. Super. 1992); Rabel v. Ill. Wesleyan 
Univ., 514 N.E.2d 552, 558–59 (Ill. App. 1987). 
 398. See, e.g., Hauser, supra note 270, at 436; Mumford, supra note 374, at 738; 
Rutledge, supra note 7, at 368. 
 399. See, e.g., Univ. of Denver v. Whitlock, 744 P.2d 54, 59–60 (Colo. 1987); see also 
Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135 (3d Cir. 1979). 
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C. Blackstone’s Legacy: Parietal Rights and Responsibilities 
Despite all this, the antitrust housing decisions in Yale College and 
Colgate University, and to a lesser extent Hamilton College, rest on the 
notion that colleges have a peculiar and particular right to direct the manner 
and conditions of the lives of their students, right down the location where 
their students will sleep.400  Such far-reaching control sounds identical to 
the rights granted in the early-century in loco parentis cases, even though 
such sweeping authority has ostensibly been a dead letter for nearly a half 
century.401  What really differs between telling someone where she must 
eat—as in the formative in loco parentis case Berea College—versus 
where she must sleep?402  Indeed, Hamilton College dictated where its 
students must eat as well!403  Given the supposedly comprehensive 
rejection of in loco parentis, how is it still making appearances in modern 
cases in the guise of parietal rights?  Even having posed the question, 
though, it cannot be entirely surprising that an ancient doctrine originally 
described by the revered Blackstone should retain a certain staying 
power.404 
Scholarship has not been blind to a certain limited survival of parietal 
rights and responsibilities;405 some authors have even applauded it as 
acknowledging the growing view of college not as the start of adulthood 
but as an extension of adolescence.406  Representative of this school of 
 
 400. See Delta Kappa Epsilon Alumni Corp. v. Colgate Univ., 492 F. Supp. 2d 106, 117 
(N.D.N.Y. 2007); Hack v. President & Fellows of Yale Coll., 237 F.3d 81, 85 (2d. Cir. 
2000); see also Hamilton Chapter of Alpha Delta Phi, Inc. v. Hamilton Coll., 106 F. Supp. 
2d 406, 413 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (“Any housing constraints experienced by students who have 
chosen to enroll despite the residential policy flow from their implied contract with 
Hamilton to comply with its rules, including the residential policy.”). 
 401. See supra Sections III.A, III.B. 
 402. See supra notes 323–27 and accompanying text. 
 403. Hamilton Coll., 106 F. Supp. 2d at 409. 
 404. Cf. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2796 (2014) (Ginsburg, 
J., dissenting) (“Moreover, history is not on the Court’s side. Recognition of the discrete 
characters of ‘ecclesiastical and lay’ corporations dates back to Blackstone.” (citing 
1WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *458 (1765))); Richard E. Myers II, Requiring a 
Jury Vote of Censure to Convict, 88 N.C. L. REV. 137, 139 (2009) (“While there is no 
question that the civil/criminal distinction is blurring at the margins, the distinction in our 
common law tradition is as old as Blackstone, and retains strong support today.” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
 405. See, e.g., Hauser, supra note 270, at 435–37; Szablewicz & Gibbs, supra note 293.  
But see Stamatakos, supra note 293, at 472 (arguing new liability not fully akin to former 
doctrine); Lake, supra note 293, at 5–6 (discrediting concerns of a perceived modern return 
to in loco parentis). 
 406. See, e.g., Sweeton & Davis, supra note 293.  Contra Marshlain, supra note 334, at 
16. 
59
Sunshine: Antitrust Precedent & Anti-Fraternity Sentiment: Revisiting Hamil
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2017
118 CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:1 
thought, Professor Eric Posner wrote that the call for more pervasive 
university oversight “comes not from parents and administrators, but from 
students themselves, who, apparently recognizing that their parents and 
schools have not fully prepared them for independence, want universities to 
resume their traditional role in loco parentis.”407  Some students seemingly 
want to be protected from one another after all.408  (Indeed, such sentiments 
have reached the pupils of Hamilton College as well.409)  With rights, 
however, come responsibilities, and several commentators have noted 
modern cases that imposed liability for failing in duties to protect their 
students on campus.410 
The archetypal modern case finding a college liable for shirking its 
supervisory duties is Furek v. University of Delaware.411  There, the 
plaintiff was a pledge of the Sigma Phi Epsilon fraternity, and suffered 
severe chemical burns when one of the brothers poured a lye-based oven 
cleaner on him as part of a hazing ritual.412  The Delaware Supreme Court 
acknowledged that the “concept of university control based on the doctrine 
of in loco parentis has all but disappeared in the face of the realities of 
modern college life”413 but then went on to harshly criticize Bradshaw, 
Whitlock, and other cases rejecting university liability as lacking internal 
logic or empirical support for their social policy.414  “Despite the rejection 
of the in loco parentis doctrine, some courts continue to recognize the 
uniqueness of the student-university relationship,” the court concluded, 
adding itself to that number.415  How exactly this unique relationship 
differed from that under in loco parentis went unexplained; the court 
 
 407. Eric Posner, Universities Are Right—and Within Their Rights—to Crack Down on 
Speech and Behavior, SLATE MAG. (Feb. 12, 2015, 2:30 PM), http://www.slate.com/
articles/news_and_politics/view_from_chicago/2015/02/university_speech_codes_students_
are_children_who_must_be_protected.html [https://perma.cc/U5PN-PUSC]. 
 408. Id.; Sweeton & Davis, supra note 293.  But see Ward, supra note 34, at 217. 
 409. See, e.g., Emily Shire, Hamilton College Students Demand Free-Speech Ban and 
Want White Faculty Out of Leadership, DAILY BEAST (Dec. 1, 2015, 8:59 PM), http://
www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/12/01/hamilton-students-deliver-list-of-83-demands-
to-college-president.html [https://perma.cc/5RVV-AEVR]. 
 410. See, e.g., Rutledge, supra note 7, at 378–84; Mumford, supra note 374, at 745–51; 
Szablewicz & Gibbs, supra note 293, at 457–61. 
 411. Furek v. Univ. of Del., 594 A.2d 506 (Del. 1991); see Mumford, supra note 374, at 
746 (“Although the doctrine of in loco parentis has been rejected, there are a few instances 
where a court has found a special relationship between the university and its students. The 
landmark case in this area is Furek v. University of Delaware. . . .” (footnotes omitted)). 
 412. Furek, 594 A.2d at 509–10. 
 413. Id. at 516–17 (citing Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135, 139 (3d Cir. 1979). 
 414. Id. at 517–18. 
 415. Id. at 518. 
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observed that “the modern university provides a setting in which every 
aspect of student life is, to some degree, university guided.”416  Key to 
finding liability, however, were the facts that the university had held itself 
out as regulating fraternities, and that the injury took place on university 
property, as the fraternity leased their land from the school.417 
In Nero v. Kansas State University,418 on receiving a report of a sexual 
assault in a residence hall, the university responded by moving the alleged 
assailant to a different and all-male hall, but took no further action pending 
resolution of criminal charges.419  Apparently owing to insufficient housing 
during an intersession term, the plaintiff and the reported assailant were 
assigned to the same coeducational dormitory, where she was allegedly 
assaulted by him in the laundry room.420  The plaintiff brought suit against 
the university.421  As in Furek, the Kansas Supreme Court ostensibly 
recognized that the general rule of in loco parentis was defunct,422 holding 
that “the university-student relationship does not in and of itself impose a 
duty upon universities to protect students from the actions of fellow 
students or third parties.  The in loco parentis doctrine is outmoded and 
inconsistent with the reality of contemporary collegiate life.”423 
Yet Nero went on to reverse the summary judgment for the defendant, 
opining that a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the university was 
responsible for the safety of those in its residence halls under premises 
liability reasoning.424  The same result applied to a fraternity’s duty to 
protect those within its housing in an analogous case, Delta Tau Delta, 
Beta Alpha Chapter v. Johnson.425  There, the Indiana Supreme Court held 
that the Greek homeowner could be held responsible when a party guest 
was sexually assaulted at the chapterhouse, reasoning that the fraternity 
was or should have been aware of the possibility of its invitees being 
attacked, given a spate of previous incidents.426  Whether the university or 
the fraternity is the proprietor of the residence, some courts have been 
 
 416. Id. at 516. 
 417. Id. at 520–22. 
 418. Nero v. Kan. State Univ., 861 P.2d 768 (Kan. 1993). 
 419. Id. at 771. 
 420. Id. at 772. 
 421. Id. 
 422. Id. at 773–74. 
 423. Id. at 778 (emphasis added). 
 424. Id. at 780–81. 
 425. Delta Tau Delta, Beta Alpha Chapter v. Johnson, 712 N.E.2d 968 (Ind. 1999). 
 426. Id. at 971 & n.4, 973 & n.5. 
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willing to hold them responsible for the general safety of those on campus 
or the property.427 
Overall, the continued philosophical viability of the parietal subset of 
in loco parentis rights and responsibilities seems to derive from the unusual 
control the university still imposes over residential circumstances, 
intermixed with vaguely paternalistic concerns about sexual safety and 
practices.428  Such reasoning carries odious echoes of the discretion 
afforded colleges “in dealing with girl students” by early-century cases.429  
Ruling on a case in which a woman alleged her college was negligent in 
protecting her from sexual assault in its dormitory, a Massachusetts court 
expounded at length on the general agreement that the university controls 
and is thus responsible for residential rules and conditions: 
  This consensus stems from the nature of the situation. The 
concentration of young people, especially young women, on a college 
campus, creates favorable opportunities for criminal behavior. The threat of 
criminal acts of third parties to resident students is self-evident, and the 
college is the party which is in the position to take those steps which are 
necessary to ensure the safety of its students. No student has the ability to 
design and implement a security system, hire and supervise security guards, 
provide security at the entrance of dormitories, install proper locks, and 
establish a system of announcement for authorized visitors. Resident 
students typically live in a particular room for a mere nine months and, as a 
consequence, lack the incentive and capacity to take corrective measures. 
College regulations may also bar the installation of additional locks or 
chains. Some students may not have been exposed previously to living in a 
residence hall or in a metropolitan area and may not be fully conscious of 
the dangers that are present. Thus, the college must take the responsibility 
on itself if anything is to be done at all. 
  Of course, changes in college life, reflected in the general decline of the 
theory that a college stands in loco parentis to its students, arguably cut 
against this view. The fact that a college need not police the morals of its 
resident students, however, does not entitle it to abandon any effort to 
ensure their physical safety. Parents, students, and the general community 
 
 427. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 894 P.2d 1366 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995) (discussed in 
Lake, supra note 293, at 19); Peterson v. S.F. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 685 P.2d 1193 (Cal. 1984) 
(discussed in Szablewicz & Gibbs, supra note 293, at 459); Relyea v. State, 385 So. 2d 1378 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (discussed in Szablewicz & Gibbs, supra note 293, at 458). 
 428. In all the cases cited in this section but for Furek—which implicated concerns about 
hazing—the suit at issue involved a sexual attack. 
 429. Woods v. Simpson, 126 A. 882, 883 (Md. 1924); see supra notes 330–32; see also 
Bickel & Lake, supra note 293, at 275 (criticizing view of in loco parentis as reciprocal 
doctrine imposing both powers and duties on universities and arguing that “just because 
students are empowered to speak on sensitive issues does not mean that female students 
should expect less protection from physical assault by other students.”). 
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still have a reasonable expectation, fostered in part by colleges themselves, 
that reasonable care will be exercised to protect resident students from 
foreseeable harm.430 
Even with the general demise of in loco parentis, the subset of parietal 
rights and responsibilities asserting control over residential arrangements 
lingers under a strained sort of premises liability gloss.431  The bench is 
disposed, in such cases, to recognize a special relationship between 
universities and their students, even if judges are often unwilling to call this 
relationship what it often seems to be: a narrowly circumscribed 
continuation of in loco parentis doctrine.432  Put simply, if colleges can 
control the students in their dormitories, they incur a concomitant duty.433  
What this means for the antitrust analysis and fraternities generally will be 
taken up in the final Part. 
IV. STRANGE BEDFELLOWS: RUMINATIONS ON THE UNIVERSITY AND 
FRATERNITY AS RIVALS 
The decline and fall of in loco parentis indicates that the authority 
colleges once wielded will no longer be recognized by the courts in the 
mine run of cases.434  In all likelihood, increased reliance on the subset of 
parietal rights reflects attempts by deans to consolidate what authority 
remains in their hands.435  As courts have demonstrated their willingness to 
accept even far-reaching parietal rules, colleges have naturally gravitated 
towards exclusionary regulations under that rubric.436  This brand of 
 
 430. Mullins v. Pine Manor Coll., 449 N.E.2d 331, 335–36 (Mass. 1983) (footnotes and 
citations omitted). 
 431. Writing in 1990, Theodore Stamatakos stridently rejected the notion promulgated 
by some contemporaneous commentators that the in loco parentis doctrine was seeing a 
“second coming.”  See Stamatakos, supra note 293; see also Bickel & Lake, supra note 293.  
This Article’s arguments are both supported by more recent developments in law, see supra 
Part II, as well as limited to the persistence of in loco parentis reasoning in the parietal 
context—that is, cases in which residential matters are at issue. 
 432. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 24, at 1151 (“However disguised and reformed, in 
loco parentis survives.”); Schoen & Falchek, supra note 334, at 128 n.3 (“This may 
represent a partial return to the in loco parentis doctrine . . . .”); Szablewicz & Gibbs, supra 
note 293, at 461–65.  But see Stamatakos, supra note 293; Bickel & Lake, supra note 293. 
 433. See, e.g., Mullins, 449 N.E.2d at 335–36 (cited supra text accompanying note 430). 
 434. See supra Sections III.A.3, III.B.2. 
 435. Ward, supra note 34, at 217 (“Moreover, some students have urged that the parietal 
regulations are an attempt by the university authorities to ‘stand in the shoes of the father’ 
thereby interfering with the private lives of the student, notwithstanding the demise of the in 
loco parentis doctrine.”). 
 436. See id.; Schonfeld, supra note 8 (detailing strategies of numerous colleges that have 
moved to ban fraternities under parietal rules). 
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antagonism hearkens back to the earliest days of universities and 
fraternities, when faculties fiercely opposed fraternities on the premise that 
such societies split the atom of students’ loyalty.437  If these are the currents 
that animate modern Greek-gown relations, the application of antitrust 
precedents will provide useful guidance; there is little more archetypal to 
competition law than long-standing competitors grappling for the loyalty 
and patronage of consumers of their services.438 
A. Twenty-First-Century Colleges and Competition 
As has been noted, the modern university corporation is far different 
from the cloistered academes of yesteryear.439  Yet as recently as 2000 in 
Yale College, the Second Circuit introduced its thoughts rather jauntily: 
We begin with the observation that if a parietal rule requiring some 
students to reside in college or university housing runs afoul of the antitrust 
laws, it has largely escaped the notice of the many colleges and universities 
across the country that have had and continue to have those rules and the 
notice of the millions of students who have attended those institutions in 
the more than a century since the Sherman Act was enacted.440 
If that is so, perhaps it is because by the time the Act came into force 
in 1890, universities were making peace with their fraternities specifically 
to accommodate students in Greek housing.441  As such, the universities of 
the early twentieth century were not attempting to commit any antitrust 
violations via their parietal rules; they were actively encouraging or at least 
allowing the construction of fraternity housing to meet their swelling 
needs.442  Some colleges still insisted students live in dormitories—unless 
they were in fraternity housing;443 others required only underclassmen to 
 
 437. See supra Part I. 
 438. See, e.g., Orley Ashenfelter & Kathryn Graddy, Anatomy of the Rise and Fall of a 
Price-Fixing Conspiracy: Auctions at Sotheby’s and Christie’s, 1 J. COMPETITION L. & 
ECON. 3 (2005); What an Art, ECONOMIST, Aug. 5, 2004 (“The irony is that, for a duopoly, 
Christie’s and Sotheby’s were for the most part extremely competitive—particularly in 
securing great collections for auction. When the two chairmen got together (at Sir 
Anthony’s suggestion), a good deal of their first meeting was taken up with complaints that 
one house was bad-mouthing the other. As one director points out, collusion was 
unnecessary: ‘With a duopoly, it’s like two people selling tomatoes in a street. If one person 
raises or lowers prices, the other one’s going to follow.’”). 
 439. See supra notes 318–20 and accompanying text. 
 440. Hack v. President & Fellows of Yale Coll., 237 F.3d 81, 85 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 441. See supra notes 26–29 and accompanying text. 
 442. See supra notes 28–32 and accompanying text. 
 443. See, e.g., Ward, supra note 34, at 219 (discussing Cooper v. Nix, 343 F. Supp. 1101 
(W.D. La. 1972)); Mandatory Housing Requirements, supra note 2, at 1027 n.257, 1039–40 
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live on campus, allowing students the option of moving to a fraternity 
thereafter.444  And, of course, many colleges did not resort to parietal rules 
at all.445  The recrudescence of parietal rules as the modality for eradicating 
unwanted fraternity competition has only arisen within the last half century 
or so.446 
Moreover, the Second Circuit’s observation also ignores sea changes 
in relevant law between 1890 and the present.  Most obvious is the 
ostensible demise of in loco parentis as viable authority.447  For much of 
the century since the Sherman Act was enacted, colleges enjoyed 
essentially untrammeled authority over their students.448  As that doctrine 
allowed colleges to expel students for any reason (or no reason at all), 
particularly to protect its control over its charges, a school’s ousting 
students in order to consolidate power over housing would be 
unremarkable.449  Only beginning in the 1960s was despotic in loco 
parentis authority withdrawn, which might reasonably be expected to 
expose colleges to antitrust liability from which they had previously been 
insulated.450 
At the same time, nineteenth-century legislators and scholars likely 
viewed colleges as ivory towers aloof from commerce.451  Only in the latter 
half of the twentieth century has the Supreme Court made transparently 
 
(discussing Pyeatte v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 102 F. Supp. 407 (W.D. Okla. 
1952)). 
 444. See, e.g., Mandatory Housing Requirements, supra note 2, at 1026 nn.254–55, 992 
n.4 (citing the University of Iowa as imposing parietal rules on only unmarried freshmen 
and sophomores), 1041 (discussing Mollere v. Se. La. Coll., 304 F. Supp. 826 (E.D. La. 
1969)); Hamilton Chapter of Alpha Delta Phi, Inc. v. Hamilton Coll., 128 F.3d 59, 61 (2d 
Cir. 1997). 
 445. See BRUBACHER & RUDY, supra note 21, at 121 (“In the latter half of the nineteenth 
century, however, the dormitory system came under increasingly heavy fire; college after 
college began to follow a policy of laissez faire in student housing, much the same as in the 
case of the course of study.”). 
 446. See Schonfeld, supra note 8; Bauer, supra note 1. 
 447. See supra Sections III.A.3, III.B.2. 
 448. See supra Section III.A.2. 
 449. See, e.g., supra notes 327–31 and accompanying text. 
 450. See supra Section III.A.3. 
 451. See BOK, supra note 67, at 2–3 (“Before 1900, American universities were small 
institutions just beginning to assume their modern form.  Their principal function was to 
provide a college education that emphasized mental discipline, religious piety, and strict 
rules governing student behavior.  Thus conceived, they remained quiet enclaves, having 
little direct impact on the outside world and little traffic with the corporations, the banks, 
and the legislative bodies that were busy transforming America into a modern industrial 
state.”); Sun & Daniel, supra note 18, at 451–52. 
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clear that colleges may be the perpetrators of antitrust violations as well.452  
To the extent colleges that thereafter moved to disadvantage fraternities 
escaped antitrust scrutiny, the fault may lie with plaintiffs who neglected to 
plead the novel theory.453  In the twenty-first century, it is entirely 
reasonable to imagine that the sophisticated educational corporations that 
compete for talent and research funds, manage billion-dollar endowments, 
and market patents also wield commercial power.454 
That federal courts continue to permit colleges the benefits of parietal 
rights raises serious questions about the judiciary’s commitment to the 
supposed consensus that colleges no longer have the right to control nor the 
duty to protect their students.455  To hold as a matter of law, as did Colgate 
University, that colleges have the prerogative to exercise “parietal rights” to 
protect their students in a “quasi-parented environment” under a theory of 
in loco parentis imports a dissonant doctrine from another era into modern 
jurisprudence.456  At the very least, if Colgate intends to once again reduce 
its students to legal incompetence, then it must be assigned the 
responsibilities that go with that.457  On the other hand, some courts have 
done just that in persevering with residential collegiate liability under 
attenuated special relationship and premises liability theories, despite the 
ostensible rejection of in loco parentis as such.458  If certain colleges are 
engaged in paternalistic revanchism, at least the regression may prove 
somewhat reciprocal.459  Nonetheless, such backsliding raises serious 
questions of whether a regime resembling in loco parentis still makes good 
public policy.460 
 
 452. See supra notes 66–73 and accompanying text. 
 453. E.g., supra Section II.B.1; cf. Manley, supra note 126, at 3 (“Many colleges and 
many fraternities overlook the fact that they can commit offenses under the antitrust laws.”). 
 454. See Sun & Daniel, supra note 18, at 451–52; see also BOK, supra note 67, at 6–7 
(noting obsolescence of the “ivory tower” model and transformation of universities 
following World War II). 
 455. See supra Sections III.A.3, III.B.2. 
 456. Delta Kappa Epsilon Alumni Corp. v. Colgate Univ., 492 F. Supp. 2d 106, 117 
(N.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 457. See supra notes 333–37 and accompanying text; e.g., Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 
F.2d 135, 139 (3d Cir. 1979). 
 458. See supra Section III.C; e.g., Furek v. Univ. of Del., 594 A.2d 506, 516–18 (Del. 
1991). 
 459. See, e.g., supra notes 430–33 and accompanying text. 
 460. Compare, e.g., Marshlain, supra note 334, at 15–17 (arguing in loco parentis 
doctrine fundamentally unfair), and Stamatakos, supra note 293, at 488–90 (arguing there 
are dire consequences of implying that in loco parentis doctrine may once again be applied 
to universities), with supra notes 405–09 (commentators opining favorably on the doctrine 
returning to force). 
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More functionally, viewing residential arrangements under the rubric 
of educational prerogatives ignores the modern reality that dormitories are 
a major economic sector: even considered alone, “Greek organizations own 
and operate in excess of $3 billion in real estate, often located in prime 
locations.  These buildings house some 250,000 students.  In short, chapter 
housing is a big business . . . .”461  And if Brown University and Temple 
University teach anything, it is that when a college faces students across the 
bargaining table rather than the professorial lectern, the arguments for 
applying antitrust protections are at their apogee.462  Rental arrangements 
are logistically and logically distinct from education, as evidenced by 
colleges without parietal requirements, and the fact that even colleges with 
parietal regulations collect rent separately from tuition.463  So obvious was 
this truism that the parties in American National Bank assumed as much.464  
As The New York Times recently wrote: 
  Even when it awards full-tuition scholarships, the university makes 
money—on dorm rooms and meal plans, books, football tickets, hoodies 
and school spirit items like the giant Bama banner Ms. Zavilowitz and her 
roommates bought for the blank wall in the suite’s common area.  All told, 
these extras and essentials brought in $173 million [to the University of 
Alabama] last year—on top of $633 million in tuition and fees, up from 
$135 million in 2005.  “I hate very much to use this analogy, but it’s like 
running a business,” [University of Alabama interim provost] Dr. Whitaker 
said.465 
Transparently financial motives would severely undermine 
universities’ arguments that they are not acting as commercial competitors 
but as educators in promulgating parietal rules.466  Like the defendant in 
 
 461. Sean P. Callan, The Chapter House Rules; How Corporate Structure Can Handcuff 
a House Corporation, FRATERNAL L., Nov. 2012, at 3–4; see Sunshine, Fraternity as 
Franchise, supra note 3, at 388–90.  At Colgate, “revenues from real estate and business 
operations” were roughly $17 million, compared to tuition and fees of $77 million.  Manley, 
supra note 202, at 1. 
 462. See, e.g., Hamilton Chapter of Alpha Delta Phi, Inc. v. Hamilton Coll., 128 F.3d 59, 
64–65 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 463. Hamilton Chapter of Alpha Delta Phi, Inc. v. Hamilton Coll., 106 F. Supp. 2d 406, 
408 (N.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 464. Am. Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co. of Chi. v. Bd. of Regents for Regency Univs., 607 F. 
Supp. 845, 846 (N.D. Ill. 1984); see also Hamilton Coll., 128 F.3d at 64–65 (noting that 
American National Bank assumed college residential housing fell within the commercial 
scope of the Sherman Act). 
 465. Laura Pappano, How the University of Alabama Became a National Player, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 3, 2016, at ED12. 
 466. See supra notes 113–15 and accompanying text. 
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Lycoming College, there are often difficult details to explain.467  Yale, for 
example, was not forcing the objecting students to actually live in campus 
dormitories, which could arguably have some educational aim.468  Rather, 
the university was demanding that students pay rent for vacant rooms 
assigned to them, even though the students were in fact living off-campus 
due to their religious objections.469  It is hard to discern any pedagogical 
objective in compelling students to recompense their host universities for 
unusable residence hall space; the only plausible motivation is to secure 
income from real estate holdings.470  As in American National Bank, courts 
might reasonably fear that the university was engaging in chicanery for 
pecuniary purposes.471  Yet it is also hard to fathom how Yale University, 
with an endowment of $25.6 billion as of 2015, could seriously be 
motivated by relatively picayune financial concerns.472 
Universities seeking to eliminate fraternities argue cogently that they 
are acting procompetitively to offer a distinct vision of an educational 
experience, and students who do not care for it are free to enroll at schools 
more friendly to Greek life.473  This Article has already discussed why this 
may not be a fair assessment: prospective students can lack the 
sophistication to evaluate the long-term impact of different housing options 
in advance,474 and students and fraternities already at the university have 
been locked in by switching costs if a new policy is promulgated.475  
Moreover, colleges have not always offered a compelling explanation of 
why students should not be able to opt out of allegedly compelling 
residential offerings without forgoing their education—that is, why should 
 
 467. See supra notes 116–18 and accompanying text. 
 468. Hack v. President & Fellows of Yale Coll., 16 F. Supp. 2d 183, 187 (D. Conn. 
1998) (“Yale denied all of the plaintiffs’ exemption requests and required them to live on 
campus in the coeducational residence halls. Yale charged the plaintiffs for the residence 
hall fee, which the plaintiffs paid. The residence hall rooms remain vacant for the plaintiffs’ 
return. All of the plaintiffs have elected, however, to reside off campus in housing ‘that 
provides . . . an appropriate environment in which to practice [their] faith.’” (alteration in 
original)), aff’d, 237 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 469. Id. 
 470. See Ward, supra note 34, at 231–34; Mandatory Housing Requirements, supra note 
2, at 995–96. 
 471. See supra notes 94–96 and accompanying text. 
 472. See Geraldine Fabrikant, Yale Endowment Returns 11.5%, Eclipsing Harvard’s 
5.8%, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2015, at B2. 
 473. See, e.g., Hamilton Chapter of Alpha Delta Phi, Inc. v. Hamilton Coll., 128 F.3d 59, 
61 (1997); Delta Kappa Epsilon Alumni Corp. v. Colgate Univ., 492 F. Supp. 2d 106, 
110-11 (N.D.N.Y. 2007); see also Yale Coll., 16 F. Supp. 2d at 196–97. 
 474. See supra notes 284–85 and accompanying text. 
 475. See supra notes 282–83 and accompanying text. 
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the education and rental businesses be tied together at all?476  But the 
colleges may be right withal; they unarguably have expertise and 
experience in pedagogical matters and interest in providing a competitive 
educational offering.477  The question is not one that has a clear answer a 
priori. 
But for that very reason, cases examining colleges’ attempts to 
eliminate fraternities from the market should afford the searching look 
dictated by the rule of reason to allow them to weigh proffered 
procompetitive benefits to the college experience against the potential 
anticompetitive aspects of banning an entire set of rival institutions.478  
Such a standard accords with other cases in the educational context.479  
Dispensing summarily with these suits as a matter of law, as occurred in 
Hamilton College, Yale College, and Colgate University,480 neglects the 
sensible precedent the Supreme Court set in Eastman Kodak.481  Even the 
dissent there agreed at least that an examination under the rule of reason 
was required.482  As the Court held: 
In the end, of course, Kodak’s arguments may prove to be correct. It may 
be that its parts, service, and equipment are components of one unified 
market, or that the equipment market does discipline the aftermarkets so 
that all three are priced competitively overall, or that any anticompetitive 
effects of Kodak’s behavior are outweighed by its competitive effects. But 
we cannot reach these conclusions as a matter of law on a record this 
 
 476. See supra notes 142–46, 200–03 and accompanying text; Mandatory Housing 
Requirements, supra note 2, at 1014–22 (comparing and balancing the financial and 
pedagogical rationales for parietal rules); cf. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Serv., Inc., 
504 U.S. 451, 485–86 (1992) (questioning legitimacy of tying arrangements).  But see, e.g., 
Hamilton Coll., 106 F.3d at 61 (proponing reasons for tying housing to education). 
 477. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2420 (2013) (approving 
deference to university “experience and expertise” in academic value of diversity in 
assembling its student body) (interpreting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)). 
 478. Contra Colgate Univ., 492 F. Supp. 2d at 117–18. 
 479. E.g., United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 678–79 (3d Cir. 1993); NCAA v. 
Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
 480. See Hamilton Coll., 106 F. Supp. 2d at 413–14; Hack v. President & Fellows of 
Yale Coll., 16 F. Supp. 2d 183, 197 (D. Conn. 1998), aff’d, 237 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2000); 
Colgate Univ., 492 F. Supp. 2d at 118. 
 481. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 485–86 (1992). 
 482. Id. at 502 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I would instead evaluate the aftermarket tie 
alleged in this case under the rule of reason, where the tie’s actual anticompetitive effect in 
the tied product market, together with its potential economic benefits, can be fully captured 
in the analysis.” (citation omitted)).  The dissent would have dismissed nonetheless because 
plaintiff had procedurally forfeited such an evaluation.  Id. at 502–03. 
69
Sunshine: Antitrust Precedent & Anti-Fraternity Sentiment: Revisiting Hamil
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2017
128 CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:1 
sparse. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals denying 
summary judgment is affirmed.483 
It is difficult to countenance how a trio of district courts in the Second 
Circuit dared go where the Supreme Court itself feared to tread.  
Competition in residential aftermarkets at colleges deserves more searching 
treatment than a handful of summary dispositions.484  This prescription 
matters because juries no less than laws are vital to holding powerful 
institutions to task.485  Counsel for the fraternity thus commented in 
response to the district court dismissal in Colgate University: “There is no 
question that Colgate monopolizes the number of beds available for people 
who require them in Hamilton, N.Y.  It is bad precedent and I think it is a 
winnable case if it gets to a jury.”486 
B. Fraternities Themselves as the Targets of Anticompetitive Action 
Fraternities are ultimately a fractious family, unable to put up a 
common front to rival their host university.  Faced with campus 
interdictions, most societies capitulated and surrendered their 
chapterhouses, leaving only a few agitators to bring suit against 
universities.487  This perpetuates a longer history of Greek-gown relations 
during which monolithic schools and their long-term faculty have been able 
to exert their will over the fraternities populated by transitory students.488  
As Professor Wilkie at Berkeley observed, since their early history “the 
rivalries between fraternities prevented them from colluding too much.  
Recall that it took nearly a hundred years for Cal fraternities to join 
together in an Interfraternity Council.”489  But it is just such bumptious 
 
 483. Id. at 485–86 (majority opinion). 
 484. Cf. Hamilton Chapter of Alpha Delta Phi, Inc. v. Hamilton Coll., 128 F.3d 59,     
64–68 (1997). 
 485. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“In suits at common law, where the value in 
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved.”); see 
also Alex Kozinski, Criminal Law 2.0, 44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. iii, xviii (2015) 
(“Juries matter.”); see generally Peter H. Lousberg, On Keeping the Civil Jury Trial, 43 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 344 (1968). 
 486. Sara Stefanini, University System Is Not a Monopoly, LAW360 (June 29, 2007, 
12:00 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/28308/university-housing-system-is-not-a-
monopoly-judge [https://perma.cc/KK5X-M73C]. 
 487. See Delta Kappa Epsilon Alumni Corp. v. Colgate Univ., 492 F. Supp. 2d 106, 108 
(N.D.N.Y. 2007); York, supra note 201 (“All but one of the Greek-letter organizations 
turned over their property by this summer.”); Hamilton Coll., 106 F. Supp. 2d at 407–08; 
Hamilton Fraternities End Lawsuit vs. College, SYRACUSE HERALD AM., May 9, 1999, at 
B1. 
 488. See supra Part I. 
 489. See WILKIE, supra note 35, at 256. 
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rivalries that are typically viewed as promoting the competitive 
environment that benefits consumers by providing optionality.490  For the 
vast majority of the schools’ history, students were able to select amongst 
very different living arrangements offered by very different landlords: 
collegiate, fraternal, and private.491 
The effect of market behavior on consumers is the generally accepted 
metric of modern antitrust analysis.492  Yet such a perspective is not 
inevitably exclusive; might not the Sherman Act also operate to protect 
small businesses from their larger and more powerful rivals?493  By those 
lights, the market for housing in many college towns exemplifies a 
situation in which antitrust protections must be brought to bear: a single 
entrenched and well-funded incumbent dominating and regulating the 
market, with a throng of small and contentious competitors vying to split 
the residuum of consumers.494  As can be seen from precedent both legal 
and practical, absent vigorous application of antitrust law there is little to 
stop the dominant player from eliminating its smaller rivals beyond its 
voluntary forbearance.495  Indeed, by leveraging its greater financial 
resources, a school can depend upon its singularity of purpose to 
succeed,496 even when a substantial portion of the initial housing market is 
initially controlled by fraternities.497 
 
 490. See Sun & Daniel, supra note 18, at 454–55; e.g., supra notes 28–32 and 
accompanying text (rivalry amongst fraternities giving rise to more and superior residential 
options). 
 491. See, e.g., Hamilton Coll., 106 F. Supp. 2d at 408 (“Until September 1995, 
residential services were provided to Hamilton students by a number of fraternities and 
private landlords in the Clinton, New York area, as well as by Hamilton.”). 
 492. See Steven C. Salop, Exclusionary Conduct, Effect on Consumers, and the Flawed 
Profit-Sacrifice Standard, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 311, 312 (2006) (“Antitrust law is said to be a 
‘consumer welfare prescription.’” (citing Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 
(1979))). 
 493. See generally Sandeep Vaheesan, The Evolving Populisms of Antitrust, 93 NEB. L. 
REV. 370 (2014). 
 494. See, e.g., Hamilton Coll., 128 F.3d at 61 (1997) (noting college grossed $7 million 
of residential revenue versus $1 million for fraternities). 
 495. See supra Sections II.B, II.C; e.g., Schonfeld, supra note 8. 
 496. See Hamilton Fraternities End Lawsuit vs. College, SYRACUSE HERALD AMERICAN, 
May 9, 1999, at B1 (recording how all but one of the fraternities challenging Hamilton’s 
action were eventually forced out of the case by mounting costs); Manley, supra note 15, at 
1. 
 497. See, e.g., Bauer, supra note 1, at 368 (noting that in 1960, “87% of Hamilton 
students belonged to fraternities”); Schonfeld, supra note 8 (“If you have roughly a third of 
the campus in all-male housing that can self-select, you’ve already set up a little bit of a 
conflict on gender. Not having that seems to be an improvement from the start.” (quoting 
Douglas Terp, Vice President for Administration at Colby College)). 
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True, “[i]t is axiomatic that the antitrust laws were passed for ‘the 
protection of competition, not competitors.’”498  But also axiomatic is that 
“[c]ompetition requires competitors” or at least the potentiality of 
competitors arising.499  If collegians are consumers,500 and colleges are 
businesses,501 preventing the latter from monopolizing the provision of 
residential services will promote robust competition in a circumscribed 
market.502  Universities’ unified residential offerings may or may not be 
superior to those offered by fraternities in a free market, but the essence of 
the Sherman Act is in rejecting command-and-control economies in favor 
of full-throated capitalism.503  Evidence suggests that students choose 
fraternities when they offer better options at economical prices, as one 
would expect in a healthy market.504  Conversely, colleges that rid 
themselves of that competition can act like any other monopolist505: 
After Hamilton College secured its monopoly power, charges for room and 
board at Hamilton College increased $2,310, exceeding the charges of its 
 
 498. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224 
(1993) (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962)); see Salop, 
supra note 492, at 312 (“However, sometimes conduct that harms competitors benefits 
consumers, implying that such conduct should be applauded as competition on the merits, 
not attacked.”). 
 499. Cory S. Capps & David Dranove, Healthcare Provider and Payer Markets, in 1 
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 63, 108 (Roger D. Blair 
& D. Daniel Sokol eds., 2015); Mitchell Schnurman, The Virgin Principle: Free Love Field 
with More Choice, DALLAS MORNING NEWS (Mar. 15, 2014), http://www.dallasnews.com/
business/business/2014/03/15/the-virgin-principle-free-love-field-with-more-choice [https://
perma.cc/UG3F-K2HB]; Allan Fels, Australia – A Regulator’s Perspective, in THE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF COMPETITION LAW IN ASIA 379, 402 (Mark Williams ed., 2013) 
(comparing views of small and large businesses); 151 CONG. REC. 6, 8670 (statement of 
Rep. Oberstar, introducing the Railroad Competition and Improvement and Reauthorization 
Act of 2005, May 4, 2005); Emmanuel Celler, What’s Wrong with “What is Wrong with the 
Antitrust Laws,” 8 ANTITRUST BULL. 571, 578 (1963); Henry D. Ostberg, The Meaning of 
the “Injury to Competition” Provision of the Robinson-Patman Act, 32 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 
26, 28 (1957). 
 500. Cf. supra note 464 (discussing Hamilton College’s view of American National 
Bank as confirming that rental of dormitory space to students is commercial). 
 501. See supra Section II.A. 
 502. See Bauer, supra note 1, at 371. 
 503. See Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 248 (1951); Missouri v. Nat’l Org. for 
Women, Inc., 620 F.2d 1301, 1302–06 (8th Cir. 1980); HYLTON, supra note 46, at 37–47; 
Sun & Daniel, supra note 18, at 454–55. 
 504. See, e.g., Bauer, supra note 1, at 350, 369, 380, 387–88; Sunshine, Fraternity as 
Franchise, supra note 3, at 389 & n.86. 
 505. Manley, supra note 202, at 2 (“[A]fter Hamilton College got control of the 
fraternity houses, the price of room and board went up on the campus and the quality of 
room and board went down.  This is typical behavior of a monopolist.”). 
72
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 2
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol39/iss1/2
2017] REVISITING HAMILTON COLLEGE 131 
closest rival, Colgate University. At the same time, available living 
facilities were reduced and students were crowded into spaces designed for 
fewer people. Hamilton College students received lower quality services at 
higher prices.506 
In focusing on fraternities as targets of colleges’ conduct, a recent 
development in Greek-gown relations at Hamilton is instructive. In the 
spring of 2015, one of the surviving groups, Theta Delta Chi, received 
sanctions for allegedly holding a party in an off-campus apartment at which 
alcohol was provided to minors: it was forbidden from recruiting for over a 
year and from hosting social events for over two years.507  The school’s 
newspaper observed that no individual member of the fraternity was 
punished or even brought before a hearing because the college could 
produce no competent evidence supporting its allegations.508  However, the 
fraternity itself was subject to the college’s plenipotentiary authority: it 
enjoyed no evidentiary protections, due process, or official hearing to 
present its case; punishment was imposed at a single dean’s sole 
discretion.509  When the fraternity tried to clarify the nature of the 
 
 506. Manley, supra note 15, at 1. 
 507. Kevin Welsh, College Sanctions Theta Delta Chi Fraternity, SPECTATOR (May 7, 
2015), http://students.hamilton.edu/spectator/news-2015/p/college-sanctions-theta-delta-chi-
fraternity/view [https://perma.cc/4RAF-GC7D]. 
 508. See id. (“The judicial process against the individuals never even reached a proper 
hearing, though. Despite evidence of underage drinking at Tops, the Dean of Students office 
failed to produce evidence connecting any specific house members with the alcohol. 
Andrew Nachemson ‘15 faced charges from the Dean of Students Office and with three of 
his housemates. He said, ‘[The Dean of Students Office] didn’t even have enough evidence 
to hold a hearing, let alone convict us of any charges.’” (alteration in original)). 
 509. The article went on: 
 The lack of compelling evidence did not impede the judicial process facing 
the Society, however. Whereas the Student Handbook outlines a clear judicial 
process for students, no guidelines at Hamilton outline a set procedure for 
sanctioning organizations. This lack of direction means that the Dean of Student’s 
Office retains full discretion over the proceedings. Students facing punishment go 
through a rigorous process involving either an administrative hearing or a Judicial 
Board hearing, but Greek organizations simply face the decisions of the Dean of 
Students Office. Dean Thompson described that in this case, “I met with the 
president [of TDX] and we agreed underage students had been served . . . then [I] 
decided on what the sanction would be.” 
 [Nachemson] explained that despite not being found responsible as an 
individual, he believes his fraternity did not fare as well because “Dean Thompson 
has absolutely no oversight in terms of doling out punishments to fraternities. She 
was able to use evidence that wasn’t permissible in a Judicial Board hearing to 
sanction the fraternity, and we were not permitted to counter that evidence with 
our own.” 
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sanctions, the dean offered the guidance that “she would know a social 
event when she sees it.”510  “Facing undefined and all-encompassing 
scrutiny going forward,” the newspaper concluded, the fraternity “decided 
to disband rather than jeopardize the status of any of their members.”511  
Such Kafkaesque adjudications illustrate how targeting fraternities 
themselves is far easier than fraternity members, allowing further leverage 
over the college’s residential rivals.512 
CONCLUSION 
Revisiting Hamilton College today, two decades after its confrontation 
with fraternities, the sightseer will find it a lovely and well-appointed 
campus,513 if not one wholly untroubled by contretemps.514  Unsurprisingly, 
 
 Bogardus supported this feeling of injustice and further explained his side of 
TDX’s experience: “our ‘process’ as a fraternity consisted of a single 45-minute 
meeting with Nancy Thompson during which we were unable to see any of the 
evidence concerning their decision.” He said that Dean Thompson had already 
arrived at a conclusion of responsibility and a sanction by the time the fraternity 
met with her, and that they faced even further unclear scrutiny during the meeting. 
Id. (first two alterations in original). 
 510. Id.  The dean was presumably not making reference to Justice Potter Stewart’s 
notorious definition of “hard core pornography”: “I shall not today attempt further to define 
the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand description; and 
perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so.  But I know it when I see it.”  
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 511. Welsh, supra note 507. 
 512. Compare supra note 509 with FRANZ KAFKA, In the Penal Colony, in SELECTED 
SHORT STORIES OF FRANZ KAFKA 95, 103 (Willa & Edwin Muir trans., 1993) (“I have been 
appointed judge in this penal colony.  Despite my youth.  For I was the former 
Commandant’s assistant in all penal matters and know more about the apparatus than 
anyone.  My guiding principle is this: Guilt is never to be doubted.  Other courts cannot 
follow that principle, for they consist of several opinions and have higher courts to 
scrutinize them.  That is not the case here, or at least, it was not the case in the former 
Commandant’s time.”); see also LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE’S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND 37 
(VolumeOne Publishing 1998) (1865) (“Fury said to a mouse, That he met in the house, 
‘Let us both go to law: I will prosecute you.—Come, I’ll take no denial; We must have a 
trial: For really this morning I’ve nothing to do.’  Said the mouse to the cur, ‘Such a trial, 
dear sir, With no jury or judge, would be wasting our breath.’ ‘I’ll be judge, I’ll be jury,’ 
said cunning old Fury: ‘I’ll try the whole cause and condemn you to death.’”). 
 513. See Rachel Lieb, Keith McArtney & Evan Klondar, Opinion, Face Off: Does 
Hamilton Allocate Its Money Wisely?, SPECTATOR (Feb. 10, 2011), http://students.
hamilton.edu/spectator/2-10-11/opinion/face-off [https://perma.cc/3YEB-FBPJ]. 
 514. See, e.g., id.; Emily Shire, Hamilton College Students Demand Free-Speech Ban 
and Want White Faculty Out of Leadership, DAILY BEAST (Dec. 1, 2015, 8:59 PM), http://
www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/12/01/hamilton-students-deliver-list-of-83-demands-
to-college-president.html [https://perma.cc/5RVV-AEVR]. 
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consolidating residential housing under the aegis of the college has not 
proven a panacea to all ills.515  Hamilton has surely established a retreat for 
the mind irrespective of means or upbringing, in the finest traditions of 
modern academia.516  But has it done so at the expense of cherished 
principles of fair play and competition?  Further, Hamilton allowed 
fraternities to continue on campus after neutralizing them as competitors,517 
albeit subject to its indiscriminate oversight,518 but other universities have 
not even been that kind to their captive societies.519  Should colleges be free 
to abolish the options offered by Greek life entirely?  Hamilton’s former 
president, for one, has opined that the school erred in allowing fraternities 
to remain at all, even in a sort of domesticated state, rather than extirpating 
them root and branch.520  Recent policy changes at Harvard University, by 
contrast, illustrate a more nuanced approach that at least partially 
accommodates both collegiate and fraternal interests to provide students 
qua consumers with some sort of choice.521 
 
 515. See, e.g., Editorial, Do We Have Traditions?, SPECTATOR (Dec. 10, 2015), http://
students.hamilton.edu/spectator/editorial-2015/p/do-we-have-traditions/view [https://perma.
cc/R3UP-MZ88] (“The culture of the College remains in transition since the upending of 
fraternity culture with the banning of houses in the ‘90s. What the College administration 
needs to realize is that, more than successful sports teams and late night events, the things 
which break up the monotony of binge drinking and make our time here meaningful are 
those collective cultures, those momentary rebellions against the normal order which make 
traditions at a college. The Spectator does not advocate any activities which harm others, but 
we believe that there is a value in bending the rules for the feeling of togetherness. We 
believe that the College’s obsession with its own public image is harmful to the experience 
of students here.”). 
 516. See, e.g., Sara Harberson, The Financial Aid Bowl Is the Ultimate High Stakes 
Game, FORT WORTH STAR TELEGRAM (Dec. 29, 2015, 5:50 PM), http://www.star-
telegram.com/opinion/opn-columns-blogs/other-voices/article52146205.html [https://perma.
cc/2P2G-6JZD]; Jon Marcus, How One Top College Ended a Policy That Weeded Out Poor 
Students, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 18, 2015, 10:24 AM), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/how-one-top-college-ended-a-policy-that-weeded-out-poor-
students_us_5671dfcee4b0648fe302101e [https://perma.cc/C5UA-4TX3]. 
 517. See supra note 229 and accompanying text.  
 518. See supra notes 507–12 and accompanying text. 
 519. See, e.g., Schonfeld, supra note 8; supra note 256 and accompanying text. 
 520. Schonfeld, supra note 8 (“He pointed to Hamilton College, where he previously 
served as president, as a school that botched its Greek reforms, opting to maintain frats and 
sororities but ban their members from dining or living together.”). 
 521. In 2016, Harvard announced a policy under which members of single-sex fraternal 
organizations would not be eligible for certain leadership positions that Harvard viewed as 
representing the college, in order to avoid implicit endorsement of such organizations’ 
values—leaving students to make their choice as to priorities.  Moreover, the new policy 
was only to be applicable to students matriculating after its announcement, thus avoiding 
some of the problems of “locked in” consumers, if not the fraternities themselves.  See       
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Yet even if some colleges are treating fraternities highhandedly, 
perhaps there is room at the intersection of the uniquely American systems 
of education and competition for some oases of curated experiences akin to 
Hamilton College.522  The long existence—and persistence—of in loco 
parentis doctrine in residential matters suggests colleges may still have 
unique prerogatives in their tutelage of young adults.523  On the other hand, 
fraternities themselves have enjoyed a lengthy and storied presence at 
American universities that likewise militates for their continued 
prerogatives.524  Whatever the outcome, the judicial system owes students, 
fraternities, and colleges a more thorough airing of the arguments for and 
against the future of fraternities in higher education than summary 
dismissals, and antitrust precedent provides an apt framework in which to 
do so. 
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 522. See DEREK BOK, HIGHER LEARNING 8–34 (1986) (placing competition at the heart of 
the distinguishing elements of American universities); see also GEORGE FALLIS, 
MULTIVERSITIES, IDEAS, AND DEMOCRACY 70 (2007) (“The American system of higher 
education is felt to be unique because of its ‘decentralization, market competition, and 
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pluralism.’” (citing BOK, supra note 522)). 
 523. See supra Part III. 
 524. See, e.g., SYRETT, supra note 20, at 3–4; Bauer, supra note 1, at 410–12. 
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